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WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT?  A PROPOSAL FOR ELEVATING 
THE STATUS OF MARRIAGE BY NARROWING ITS DEFINITION, WHILE 
UNIVERSALLY EXTENDING THE RIGHTS AND BENEFITS ENJOYED BY 
MARRIED COUPLES 
JAMES L. MUSSELMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written in recent years regarding marriage and its place in 
modern society.  Articles have been published advocating the expansion of 
marriage to include same-sex couples,1 the abolition of government-regulated 
marriage,2 and condemning the “withering away” of marriage and all it 
represents.3  Authors have proposed replacing the legal status of marriage with 
a new status bearing different nomenclature, such as “domestic limited 
partnership,” and have suggested creating different rules, rights and obligations 
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 1. See, e.g., Tobin A. Sparling, All in the Family: Recognizing the Unifying Potential of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 187 (2001); John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex 
Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119 (1999). 
 2. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, A “Judeo-Christian” Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1221 (2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing 
Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (2006).  But see Nancy J. Knauer, A Marriage Skeptic Responds 
to the Pro-Marriage Proposals to Abolish Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1261 (2006) (expressing 
concern that deregulation of marriage would simply give rise to other issues regarding legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships); Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1311 (2006) (expressing concern that contract law, by itself, is not capable of sufficiently regulating 
marriage); Dr. Charles J. Reid, Jr., And the State Makes Three: Should the State Retain a Role in 
Recognizing Marriage?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1277 (2006) (arguing that, for a variety of reasons, the 
state is in the best position to regulate marriage). 
 3. See Lynn D. Wardle, The “Withering Away” of Marriage: Some Lessons from the Bolshevik Family 
Law Reforms in Russia, 1917–1926, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469 (2004). 
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than those currently pertaining to the status of marriage.4  Others have proposed 
the creation of a new status for same-sex couples, which roughly parallels the 
rules, rights and obligations currently applicable to married couples, and would 
exist alongside the current legal status of marriage.5  The legislatures of several 
states have taken varying positions on these issues.  While some states have 
created a separate “civil union” status, others have expanded the traditional 
definition of marriage or explored the idea of “covenant marriage.”  For 
example, the Vermont legislature created the status of “civil union” that confers 
the same benefits enjoyed by married couples on same-sex couples who choose 
it.6  Additionally, the Massachusetts and California legislatures have been 
directed by the highest courts in those states to redefine marriage to include 
same-sex couples.7  Conversely, many state legislatures have taken the opposite 
view, defining marriage restrictively as a union between one man and one 
woman.8  In three states, the legislature created a separate form of marriage—
termed “covenant marriage”—a purely elective status available only to 
different-sex couples and creating stringent requirements for both entry and 
exit.9 
Against this backdrop, the marriage debate rages on; each side equally 
convinced of the merits of its arguments and making them vigorously with 
legal, ethical, moral and religious overtones.  Apparently, it is not possible for 
states to reach a consensus regarding a universal definition of a legally 
recognized relationship that would replace the current status of marriage.  At 
the same time, each side appears woefully unhappy with the status quo. One 
side desires an expansive definition of marriage whereas the other desires a 
more restrictive definition, like those currently governing most jurisdictions.  
Some in the more restrictive camp also desire mandatory requirements for 
entering and exiting the marriage relationship. 
Some very compelling (and some not so compelling) arguments have been 
advanced on each side of the debate.  It is painfully obvious that whether the 
 
 4. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Drobac & Antony Page, A Uniform Domestic Partnership Act: Marrying 
Business Partnership and Family Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 349 (2007) (proposing a domestic partnership 
model based on business partnership law as a substitute for civil marriage). 
 5. See, e.g., Greg Johnson, Civil Union, a Reappraisal, 30 VT. L. REV. 891, 891 (2006) (suggesting 
that couples could be given the right to choose their form of legally recognized relationship from 
several options, including domestic partnership and civil union). 
 6. See William C. Duncan, Whither Marriage in the Law, 15 REGENT U.L. REV. 119, 123–24 (2003). 
 7. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Religion, Polygamy, and Non-Traditional Families: Disparate Views 
on the Evolution of Marriage in History and in the Debate Over Same-Sex Unions, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
19, 20 (2007) (stating that Goodridge was the first decision by the highest court of any state to 
constitutionally recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 
384, 402 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that the California statutory provisions that limit marriage to 
opposite-sex couples violate the California Constitution); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (ruling that barring same-sex couples from the protections, benefits and 
obligations of civil marriage violates the Massachussetts Constitution). 
 8. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 120 (describing the process by which constitutional 
amendments in Alaska and Hawaii were enacted to restrict the definition of marriage to opposite-
sex couples). 
 9. Covenant marriage laws have so far been enacted in Louisiana, Arizona and Arkansas.  Id. 
at 121–22. 
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status of marriage is modified or remains the same, a substantial number of 
people will be unhappy and feel that their personal morals, ethics and beliefs 
have been violently offended. If a consensus of any kind is to be reached, it must 
satisfy the most compelling arguments made by each side.  How is that possible 
when the positions of the two camps are so polarized?  The solution must 
provide for more than one legally recognized relationship that couples may 
enter, each offering the same rights and benefits but with different requirements. 
This article proposes an approach that defines two legally recognized 
relationships.  First, opposite-sex couples desiring a traditional marriage could 
choose the option that generally adopts portions of the covenant marriage law 
enacted thus far by three states. Second, all couples, whether same-sex or 
opposite-sex, could choose the option most similar to today’s current marriage 
relationship. 
Part II of this article discusses the general history of the marriage concept.  
Marriage has historically taken different forms and has had varying degrees of 
importance over time and with respect to different groups.  Part III addresses 
some of the criticisms levied against the current state of marriage, and the 
responses to such criticisms.  Part III.A discusses the view that marriage has 
become much too liberalized and inclusive therefore losing much of its original 
meaning and importance. This liberalization has been described as a “withering 
away” of marriage, much to the peril of society.  As explained in Part III.B, one 
response to that view has been the enactment of covenant marriage laws.  Part 
IV advocates an expansive view of marriage that would include same-sex 
couples and further explains some of the arguments advanced on both sides of 
that debate.  Part IV also discusses the proposals offered to resolve that debate.  
Part V explains in more detail the need for a multi-faceted approach, and fleshes 
out the proposal described above. 
II.  THE HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF MARRIAGE 
In telling the creation story, the Bible describes how woman was made 
from the rib of man and states that “[f]or this reason a man will leave his father 
and mother and be united to his wife, and they will become one flesh.”10  This 
statement implies that such unity, or marriage, shall be between one woman and 
one man.11  Yet history reveals that marriage has taken many different forms 
and has assumed varying degrees of importance in different cultures.12  There 
are many biblical examples of marriages not following the one man to one 
woman implication of Genesis.  One famous example is King Solomon, who had 
700 wives.13 
 
 10. Genesis 2:24.  All citations to the Bible are to the New International Version. 
 11. See Matthew 19:4–5 (quoting Jesus Christ, in referencing the creation story, that “man and 
wife” meant a male and a female). 
 12. See Wardle, supra note 3, at 469 (citing JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: 
MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN WESTERN TRADITION 2–3, 194 (1997) (discussing five models of 
marriage in Western Christian tradition); MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY 
LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE  7–14 (1977) (discussing alternative 
forms of marriage regulation and different meanings of marriage). 
 13. See 1 Kings 11:3. 
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Commentators differ regarding the historical importance of marriage in 
early Christianity.  According to Professors Jennifer Drobac and Antony Page, 
“[b]efore the late eighteenth century, marriage typically only served one or more 
of three goals: (1) to consolidate wealth and resources, (2) to forge political 
alliances, and (3) to consummate peace treaties.”14  As for Christianity’s role, the 
authors assert that “[m]arriage was not originally a Christian religious 
institution.  During its first thousand years, the Catholic Church did not 
consider marriage a sacrament and weddings were not celebrated in 
churches.”15  Professor Daniel Crane provides substantial historical support for 
the proposition that the Catholic Church’s modern view of marriage as a 
Christian sacrament—like baptism and the Eucharist—began to emerge early in 
church history and was theologically formalized at least by the Middle Ages.16 
Professor Crane also discusses various early, prominent, Protestant authorities 
on marriage who state “it is possible to locate a distinctive Protestant tradition 
that is both ambivalent toward the sacramental understanding of marriage yet 
insistent that marriage remains a spiritual institution.”17 
Professors Drobac and Page point out that American law, consistent with 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, has never recognized marriage as 
a sacrament or other religious construct. The law recognizes marriage only as a 
civil contract.18  Although marriage remains an extraordinarily important 
religious concept, religious leaders who perform marriages are authorized to do 
so by local law and are charged with verifying the satisfaction of civil marriage 
license requirements.19  In that regard, governmental regulation of marriage is 
entirely secular.  Nevertheless, the concept of marriage adopted and approved 
for regulation is “based on religious tradition and the English common law: . . . 
lifelong, monogamous, Christian marriage.”20 
In its early form adopted from the English common law, marriage in 
America “was a strongly hierarchical relationship.  Under the system of 
coverture, a married woman’s legal and economic identity merged into her 
husband’s.”21  In other words, the husband was in total, legal control of the 
marital relationship and any property produced during the marriage.  As the 
Texas Supreme Court succinctly stated, “[a]t common law, the husband and 
wife were one, and the husband was that one.”22  This model remained in place, 
virtually untouched for about two centuries; indeed, it persevered despite 
 
 14. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 357 (citing EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: 
AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO MARRY 7, 104 (2004)). 
 15. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 357. 
 16. Crane, supra note 2, at 1229–33. 
 17. Id. at 1237. 
 18. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 357 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: 
FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS AND THE LAW 7 (2004)). 
 19. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 357–58. 
 20. Ann Laquer Estin, Marriage and Belonging, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1690, 1691 (reviewing NANCY F. 
COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000)). 
 21. Id. at 1692. 
 22. Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. 1971). 
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“[w]omen receiv[ing] the right to vote in 1920 and gain[ing] greater citizenship 
and nationality rights in the decades that followed.”23 
Sweeping changes began to occur in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
In her book, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation, Nancy Cott 
identified the decade of the Second World War as an important turning point 
regarding the traditional model of marriage.24  “During the 1940’s, the Supreme 
Court abandoned its hostility toward migratory divorce, and the American Bar 
Association recommended moving to a no-fault principle in divorce.”25  As a 
result, fault was eliminated as a prerequisite for divorce.26  Eventually the 
concept of the husband being in total control of the marital relationship and the 
marital property began to give way to a model of equal rights for both spouses.  
For example, Texas, a community property state, amended its constitution in 
1972 to ensure equal rights between the sexes27 and subsequently enacted laws 
equalizing the marital property rights of both spouses.28  In the common law 
property states, the concept of coverture gave way to a system that essentially 
gave the spouses equitable rights of distribution upon dissolution of the 
marriage.29 
III.  WHAT HAS GONE WRONG WITH MARRIAGE?  DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES 
A. Is Marriage “Withering Away”? 
There is no question that the elimination of fault as a prerequisite for 
divorce has fundamentally changed the concept of marriage.  Rather, the 
difference of opinion lies in whether marriage has changed for better or worse.  
As states began enacting no-fault divorce laws, the prevalence of divorce 
increased dramatically.  Professor Allen Parkman cites to statistics reflecting that 
the annual national divorce rate was approximately ten per 1,000 women fifteen 
years and older for most of the 1950’s and into the 1960’s, but rose steadily after 
1964 until 1979, when it peaked at 22.8.30  After 1979, the divorce rate plateaued 
and in 1996, the last year for which we have reliable national data, the divorce 
rate was 19.5.31  It has recently been estimated that nearly half of all marriages in 
America will end in divorce.32 
Professor Parkman asserts that significant keys “to a successful marriage 
are sacrifices on behalf of the relationship, the expectation of reciprocity by the 
other family members, and a commitment by both spouses to their 
 
 23. Estin, supra note 20, at 1697. 
 24. Id. at 1697. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 361. 
 27. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a. 
 28. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. 
 29. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 220 (1982). 
 30. Allen M. Parkman, The Contractual Alternative To Marriage, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 125, 125 (2005) 
(citing U.S. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 43 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 9, tbl. 1 
(1995)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Wardle, supra note 3, at 498. 
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relationship.”33  He argues that no-fault divorce laws “create perverse incentives 
that discourage people from taking the steps necessary to make their marriages 
a success”34 by inadequately compensating spouses for sacrifices made during 
marriage.  Instead, spouses are encouraged to make decisions during marriage 
that benefit themselves at the expense of the family.35  Professors Eric Rasmusen 
and Jeffrey Stake elaborate on this notion: 
[T]he legal reforms radically changed the incentives married persons 
confronted.  With no assurance that a marriage would continue and no security 
for either party in the judicially determined terms of divorce, the parties to a 
marriage remained nearly as financially insecure after marriage as they had 
been when single.  Spreading of financial losses within the marital unit could no 
longer be relied upon when one spouse had the option to bail out of a 
household in difficulty.  Devoting time and energy to producing assets useful to 
the marriage became riskier.  A career became a safer bet for either party.  
People across the country responded to those new incentives, spending more 
time at the office and less at home.36 
Professors Drobac and Page list four principle goals that married couples 
hope to achieve: to “(1) demonstrate love and commitment, both to each other 
and in the eyes of the community; (2) secure the parentage and welfare of their 
children; (3) create an efficient and unified domestic economic enterprise; and 
(4) obtain legal rights and benefits based on their marital status.”37  They assert 
that the free availability of unilateral no-fault divorce thwarts all four of these 
goals: (1) spouses are motivated to protect themselves financially by spending 
more time at work at the price of demonstrating less love and commitment to 
each other and to their marriage; (2) children suffer as a result of divorce due to 
adverse financial consequences, and experience more behavioral, emotional, 
health and academic problems than do children whose parents have not 
divorced; (3) an efficient and unified domestic economic enterprise is difficult to 
create when spouses cannot be confident that the marriage will survive no 
matter how much time and energy they devote to it; and (4) the legal rights and 
benefits of marriage can obviously not be obtained if the marriage ends in 
divorce.38 
Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht argues that no-fault divorce is only one of 
many avenues in which the law has retreated from the regulation of marriage.  
This retreat has resulted in allowing the spouses not only to decide when to 
divorce but also “to enter the relationship of marriage without the information 
that used to be required, to define the content of their marriage and to determine 
its day-to-day regulation.”39  Professor Spaht further asserts that the practical 
 
 33. Parkman, supra note 30, at 126. 
 34. Id. at 127. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage 
Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 459 (1998). 
 37. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 352–53 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987)). 
 38. Id. at 362–64. 
 39. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law from the 
Regulation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REV. 243, 243–44 (2003). 
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result of the law’s retreat from marriage regulation is that “people in Western 
countries have concluded that marriage is a private relationship which the law 
has no right to regulate and whose consequences affect only the parties to the 
marriage, not the general public, not even their own children.”40 Accordingly, 
“abandonment by law of the regulation of marriage played a significant role in 
changing society’s understanding of marriage and its public character.”41  She 
concludes that 
[w]hat our law . . . teaches about marriage needs revision desperately—a 
revision that reinvigorates, strengthens, and protects the most fundamental of 
human institutions.  The need for reinvigoration in law of the traditional 
understanding of marriage is pressing; it may be the only way Americans can 
resist other ideas inimical to and destructive of the institution of marriage.42 
Other commentators have adopted a contrary position, heralding the 
establishment of no-fault divorce as a much needed progressive reformation of 
family law.  For example, Professor Cynthia VanSickle observes that prior to the 
advent of no-fault divorce unhappy couples desiring a divorce were often forced 
to fabricate fault.43  This often resulted in collusion between the parties wherein 
one spouse agreed to take full responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage 
to facilitate obtaining a divorce.44  Professor VanSickle asserts that 
[t]he change from fault to no-fault forced women to become better educated, 
more marketable, and consequently, more financially independent.  To revert to 
a traditional, fault-based divorce system would encourage women to resume 
traditional gender roles, which emphasize the financial dependence of women 
on their spouses.  Further, it also stands to reason that any financial hardship or 
dependence incurred by a woman in marriage and divorce would also be felt by 
the children of the marriage.45 
Professor VanSickle concludes that “eliminating the no-fault provision 
from divorce actions is indeed a throwback to the pre-Civil Rights movement 
that serves to stratify gender roles and return them to the status quo of the pre-
World War II United States.”46 
As the national divorce rate rose due to either the factors described above 
or for other reasons altogether, men and women were increasingly deciding to 
delay or reject marriage.47  From 1950 to 2002, the median age of first marriages 
rose significantly, from 22.8 years for men and 20.3 years for women, to 26.9 for 
men and 25.3 for women.48  A number of couples delaying marriage choose to 
 
 40. Id. at 244. 
 41. Id. at 247. 
 42. Id. at 306. 
 43. Cynthia M. VanSickle, A Return to the Anti-Feminist Past of Divorce Law: The Implications of the 
Covenant or Marriage Laws as Applied to Women, 6 J. L. SOCIETY 154, 158 (2005). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 159. 
 46. Id. at 178. 
 47. Parkman, supra note 30, at 125. 
 48. Id. at 125 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT TO THE MARCH 
2002 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P20-547, available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabMS-2.xls). 
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cohabitate.  According to the 2000 Census, “the number of unmarried couples 
living together increased by more than 70% between 1990 and 2000.”49  Professor 
Lynn Wardle reported at the time of his article that about 5% of all American 
households are comprised of nonmarital cohabitants, up from 3% a decade 
previously, and that “[a]pproximately half of all persons who marry have 
cohabited prior to marriage.”50  In addition, the success rate of cohabitating 
unmarried couples is much worse than that of marriages; approximately 90% of 
cohabitating unmarried couples end their relationship within the first five 
years.51 
Collectively, the higher median age of first marriages for both men and 
women and the elevated divorce rate for those who do marry contributes 
significantly to the increasing percentage of unmarried heads of household.  In 
2004, almost 50% of heads of households were not married, up from almost 45% 
in 1990.52  The percentage is higher yet in African American families; in 2000, it 
was estimated that only 48% of such families were headed by married couples.53  
Those factors also contribute significantly to the increasing number of children 
born to unmarried mothers.  Professors Drobac and Page observe that, “[i]n 
2002, a record 34% of births were by unwed women.  More than twice as many 
unmarried African American women gave birth than married African American 
women did.  The percentage of births to unmarried mothers for all races has 
almost doubled since 1980, when the rate was 18.4%.”54  Indeed, Professor Spaht 
also argues that “[n]o longer does the general public intuit that the married 
couple is the instrumentality charged with civilization’s most burdensome, time-
consuming but indispensable task, the acculturation of children.”55 
Professor Lynn Wardle devoted an entire article to the “withering away” of 
marriage.  He described the official state effort in Russia during the two decades 
following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which radically transformed and 
de-privileged the institution of marriage, and compared it to developments in 
contemporary American law.56  The Russian attempt to promote the “withering 
away” of marriage was based on socialist ideology holding the state 
economically responsible for all its members and thus eliminating the need for 
marriage or family.57  Professor Wardle provided the following summary of the 
Bolshevik experiment: 
Within two months of the October 1917 Revolution, the government drastically 
liberalized divorce, allowing divorce without grounds, either by mutual consent 
or upon unilateral request.  The same decree mandated civil registration of 
marriage and abolished legal recognition of future religious marriages.  In 1918 
those reforms were codified in a new Family Law Code that mingled some 
 
 49. Wardle, supra note 3, at 498. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 352 n.9. 
 52. Id. at 352 nn.4–5. 
 53. Id. at 352 n.7. 
 54. Id. at 365 (footnotes omitted). 
 55. Spaht, supra note 39, at 244. 
 56. See generally Wardle, supra note 3. 
 57. Id. at 447. 
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progressive provisions (such as joint property ownership and division) with 
other more radical provisions.  The 1918 Code also legally abolished illegitimacy 
and adoption.  In 1920, another national decree legalized state-funded abortion-
on-demand.  Finally, in 1926, a new Family Law Code was adopted that further 
liberalized divorce by entirely eliminating judicial review for mutual divorces, 
and allowing unilateral divorce through simple process—essentially postcard 
divorce.  And since form was deemed irrelevant, if not a capitalist tool, and 
informal liaisons were considered as legitimate as marriage, the 1926 Code also 
extended full marital status and benefits to de facto couples.58 
The Bolshevik experiment, forcing the “withering” of marriage and family, 
failed miserably.59  Professor Wardle quoted an authority on Soviet social 
history, as follows: 
“Soviet social reconstruction was paid for in the coin of individual suffering and 
broken families.”  For some subgroups of Russian society, especially some 
“peasants, family life often simply ceased to exist.”  After the Revolution, 
“moral decline and psychological excesses developed which ‘further deepened 
the disorganization of the family . . . and [created] economic hardships,’ and in 
marital family relations” reduced the family to a condition lower than had 
“existed in Tsarist Russia.”60 
Because divorce became so easy to accomplish, the divorce rate rose 
rapidly.  In most cases, women continued to be responsible for supporting the 
children, yet received little, if any child support or alimony.61  Men began 
changing wives regularly, with some men marrying more than twenty women.62  
Abandonment, coerced divorce, blackmail and extortion became more 
prevalent.63  Abortions became more commonplace, and the number of 
abandoned street children increased significantly.64  “Children were the most 
tragic and numerous victims of the new family order.”65 
In an insightful comparison of the Bolshevik experiment with 
developments in American family law and society, Professor Wardle concludes 
that “[t]he same social practices . . .  embraced by Russian revolutionary society 
[in] 1917 seem to have been accepted and normalized in American society at the 
turn of the millennium,”66 and “[t]he same legal policy elements that combined 
to create the radical Bolshevik family law reforms seem to have emerged in the 
family policies of the American nation and/or the family law regulations of the 
American states.”67  The similarities between the Bolshevik experiment and 
American family law reform are unmistakable: divorce in America, as in the 
Bolshevik regime, has become extremely liberalized by the adoption of 
 
 58. Id. at 473 (footnotes omitted). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 490–91 (quoting H. KENT GEIGER, THE FAMILY IN SOVIET RUSSIA (1968)). 
 61. Id. at 491. 
 62. Id. at 492. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 497. 
 67. Id. 
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unilateral no-fault divorce laws;68 bearing children outside of marriage has 
become commonly accepted and is no longer subject to legal or social stigma;69 
and the United States Supreme Court has legalized abortion..70 
Professor Wardle asserts that “[i]n some ways, American family policy-
makers have gone far beyond the Russian Bolsheviks with regard to elevating 
extra-marital sexual relations and giving marital status to nonmarital 
cohabitants.”71  In Lawrence v. Texas,72 the Supreme Court recognized “the right 
of adults to enter personal sexual relationships as part of an unwritten 
fundamental ‘right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.’”73  In 2000, the American Law 
Institute recommended family law reforms that provided for the recognition of 
nonmarital domestic partnerships for all couples, whether same-sex or different-
sex, and extended the same economic benefits accorded to married couples 
when they divorce.74  Professor Wardle argues that these reforms “manifest that 
the mainstream of elite leaders of the bench and bar consider nonmarital 
relationships to be functionally equivalent to marriage in all significant respects 
relevant to any public policy in family law.”75  In addition, legislation has been 
adopted in several states legalizing in various ways relationships of same-sex 
couples, and extending marriage or marriage-like status to them.76  Professor 
Wardle asserts that, as a result, “[t]here is a strong, growing legal and social 
trend in the United States to extend marital status and benefits to nonmarital 
relations that is similar to if not more extreme than the policies adopted by the 
Russian Bolsheviks in the decade after the 1917 Revolution.”77 
B. A Response: Covenant Marriage 
To combat the perceived deterioration of the traditional concept of 
marriage as a union of one man and one woman intended to be indissoluble 
until death, some state legislatures considered establishing an alternate form of 
marriage that couples could choose rather than the default form already in 
existence.  Legislation was unsuccessfully introduced in several states to enact 
“covenant marriage” laws.78  These laws embraced the concept of so-called 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 500. 
 70. Id. at 501. 
 71. Id. at 502. 
 72. 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003). 
 73. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 74. Wardle, supra note 3, at 504. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 504–05. 
 77. Id. at 505.  In addition to the legal reforms described above, Professor Wardle identifies 
several ideological elements that have contributed to the “withering away” of marriage.  For 
example, he cites extensively to feminist and gay legal scholars who advocate abolishing marriage as 
a legal institution, and replacing it with legal concepts that govern other types of interactions and 
relationships between individuals, such as contract and property law.  He states that “[f]eminist 
scholars have long criticized marriage as a repressive and oppressive institution.”  Id. at 508. 
 78. See Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust 
Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 943–44 (1998) (stating that covenant 
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“supervows”—legally cognizable premarital contracts in which couples make 
marital commitments beyond those required by law.79  Adoption of a covenant 
marriage law established the novel concept of a two-tiered marriage system in 
the adopting state. 
In Louisiana, state representative Tony Perkins was interested in legislation 
that would strengthen families and joined forces with Professor Katherine Shaw 
Spaht, of Louisiana State University, to draft a covenant marriage law to be 
introduced in the Louisiana legislature.80  The law’s stated purpose was to act as 
“an antidote to the high rates of divorce and as a proactive measure to bolster 
the institution of marriage.”81  The law was eventually enacted and became fully 
effective in 1997.82  Subsequently, Arizona in 1998 and Arkansas in 2001 enacted 
covenant marriage laws that are substantially similar to Louisiana’s.83  All 
require that a couple desiring to marry make a choice between the new covenant 
marriage statute and the standard form of marriage governed by statutes in 
existence when the new covenant marriage law was enacted. 
1. What is Covenant Marriage? 
The covenant marriage statutes differ from the standard marriage statutes 
in several key ways.  First, the covenant marriage statutes contain much more 
stringent entrance requirements.  In Louisiana, a couple desiring to enter a 
covenant marriage must execute a declaration of intent to contract a covenant 
marriage.  The declaration states the couple’s commitment to: (1) live together as 
husband and wife for the remainder of their lives; (2) disclose to each other 
everything that could adversely affect their marriage; (3) receive premarital 
counseling regarding the nature, purpose and responsibility of marriage; and (4) 
take all reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, including marital counseling 
as may be necessary.84  The declaration of intent must include an affidavit by the 
couple “attesting that they have received premarital counseling from a priest, 
minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman of any 
religious sect, or a professional marriage counselor.”85  The counseling must 
include “a discussion of the seriousness of covenant marriage, communication 
that a covenant marriage is a commitment for life, and a discussion of the 
obligation to seek marital counseling in times of marital difficulties.”86  The 
 
marriage bills were unsuccessfully introduced in Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Indiana, Illinois and 
Washington). 
 79. Id. at 944. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 946.  For an interesting discussion of the manner in which the covenant marriage bill 
was introduced in the Louisiana legislature and ultimately became law, see Gary H. Nichols, 
Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 397, 442–44 (1999) 
(explaining how Representative Perkins introduced the legislation in a manner which made 
opposing the bill the same as being against the idea of family). 
 83. Chauncey E. Brummer, The Shackles of Covenant Marriage: Who Holds the Keys to Wedlock?, 25 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 261, 276, 278 (2003). 
 84. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (2000). 
 85. Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(a). 
 86. Id. 
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affidavit must also confirm that the couple has “received and read the 
informational pamphlet developed and promulgated by the office of the 
attorney general entitled ‘Covenant Marriage Act’ which provides a full 
explanation of the terms and conditions of a covenant marriage.”87  The 
declaration of intent must also include an attestation, signed by the counselor, 
“confirming that the parties were counseled as to the nature and purpose of the 
marriage.”88 
Second, the covenant marriage statutes make obtaining a divorce more 
difficult than in the standard marriage statutes.  In Louisiana, individuals bound 
by covenant marriage can obtain a divorce by proving that: (1) the other spouse 
has committed adultery; (2) the other spouse has committed a felony and has 
been sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor; (3) the other spouse has 
abandoned the matrimonial domicile for one year and refuses to return; (4) the 
other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce 
or a child of either spouse; or (5) the spouses have been living apart 
continuously without reconciliation for two years.89  A spouse in a covenant 
marriage may choose to obtain a judgment of separation from bed and board (a 
legal separation short of divorce) rather than divorce by proof of the identical 
grounds mentioned above.90  Additional grounds for obtaining a judgment of 
separation from bed and board include proof of “habitual intemperance of the 
other spouse, or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse, if 
such habitual intemperance, or such ill-treatment is of such a nature as to render 
their living together insupportable.”91  A divorce may also be obtained if the 
spouses have been living apart continuously without reconciliation for one year 
after the execution of a judgment for separation from bed and board.92  That 
period is extended to eighteen months if there exists at least one minor child of 
the marriage, unless abuse of a child is the basis for obtaining the judgment of 
separation from bed and board, in which case the period reverts to one year.93 
Finally, the statute requires that the spouses take all reasonable steps to 
preserve the marriage, including the marital counseling described in the 
declaration of intent, whenever the spouses experience marital difficulties.  In 
the event of a separation, marital counseling must continue until a divorce is 
obtained.94  However, marital counseling is not required “when the other spouse 
has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of 
one of the spouses.”95 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(b). 
 89. Id. § 9:307(A). 
 90. Id. § 9:307(B). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. § 9:307(A)(6)(a). 
 93. Id. § 9:307(A)(6)(b). 
 94. Id. § 9:307(C). 
 95. Id. § 9:307(D).  As stated above, the covenant marriage statutes in Arizona and Arkansas are 
substantially similar to Louisiana’s, with just a few minor differences.  See Brummer, supra note 83, at 
276–78.  (“The only major differences in the Arizona law appear in the grounds for marital 
dissolution.  The Arizona covenant marriage statute permits a party to seek a divorce when the other 
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2. Criticism of Covenant Marriage 
a.   The Divorce Provisions 
 Covenant marriage laws have been the subject of much criticism.  Most 
criticism revolves around the statute’s divorce provisions, chiefly the return to 
the fault-based divorce laws that proved so unworkable in the past.  Regardless 
of one’s opinion regarding whether fault-based divorce laws or no-fault divorce 
is preferable from a public policy standpoint, making a divorce more difficult to 
obtain forces married couples desiring a divorce to discover more creative ways 
of achieving that objective.  This is apparent from examining the practices of 
divorcing couples at a time when most of the states required fault-based 
divorce. 
 A common way of avoiding the stringent requirements of a fault-based 
divorce statute was to examine the required fault grounds, collude with each 
other and with third parties, and create a situation to satisfy at least one of the 
statutory grounds for divorce.  For example, 
[t]he use of “hotel perjury” was widespread during the height of fault-based 
divorce.  In trying to secure a divorce based on the grounds of adultery, couples 
would “team up” to recreate the famous hotel scene.  Couples arranged for the 
husband to be caught in the act of “sitting beside a scantily clad” anonymous 
female (preferably blonde) when the wife, a process server, and private 
detective armed with a camera burst in.  This practice became common 
knowledge when an expose in the New York Mirror lead with the headline “I 
Was the Unknown Blonde in 100 NY Divorces.”96 
For couples unwilling to lie in court to obtain their divorce, other methods 
were available.  Because every state’s divorce statute was different, spouses 
could simply cross state lines to find a state with more liberal divorce laws than 
their resident state.  Some states, mostly in the western region, saw the 
opportunity for profit by attracting spouses from more restrictive states and 
convincing them to vacation there for long enough to satisfy a short residency 
requirement and subsequently obtain a divorce.97  Spouses who lacked the 
 
spouse has habitually used drugs or alcohol, . . . [and] permits parties to a covenant marriage to 
obtain a divorce when they mutually agree to do so.”). 
 96. Heather Flory, “I Promise to Love, Honor, Obey . . . and Not Divorce You”: Covenant Marriage 
and the Backlash Against No-Fault Divorce, 34 FAM. L.Q. 133, 136 n.24 (2000) (citing J. HERBERT 
DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH 
CENTURY AMERICA 89 (1997)).  See also Jeanne Louise Carriere, “It’s Déjà vu All Over Again”: The 
Covenant Marriage Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701, 1743–45 
(1998).  (“A less expensive form of perjury also proved useful in obtaining annulments for fraud.  It 
required not hotel rooms and paid correspondents, but merely witnesses willing to testify that they 
were present prior to the marriage and heard one spouse misrepresent his position on, for example, 
birth control.”). 
 97. See Flory, supra note 96, at 136.  See Carriere, supra note 96, at 1731–43, for an extensive 
discussion of “migratory divorce” as it was practiced when fault-based divorce laws were still 
prevalent.  “Migratory divorce” was enabled by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 
Constitution, which requires that a divorce granted by a U.S. jurisdiction be given effect in every 
sister state. 
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means or wherewithal to find ways around stringent divorce requirements 
simply abandoned their spouses and families and disappeared, oftentimes 
leaving families without much-needed support.98 
Some commentators have examined the specific fault-based grounds of the 
covenant marriage statutes and concluded that they exclude situations that may 
present serious risk of harm to a spouse or child.  For example, the Louisiana 
statute provides grounds for divorce if the spouse seeking the divorce or a child 
of either spouse is subject to physical or sexual abuse.  But it makes no provision 
for other dangerous behavior, such as “extreme emotional abuse, threatening 
behavior, confinement or the withholding of financial support.”99  This failure is 
tempered by a spouse’s ability to obtain a separation from bed and board for 
“habitual intemperance of the other spouse, or excesses, cruel treatment, or 
outrages of the other spouse, if such habitual intemperance, or such ill-treatment 
is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable.”100  It 
provides “a covenant marriage spouse who has been victimized in . . . [non]-
physical ways with a means by which [he or] she can escape an abusive 
marriage without waiting two years for a no-fault divorce . . . .”101  However, a 
victimized spouse still could not obtain a divorce until either the one year or 
eighteen month period (as applicable) after the execution of a judgment for 
separation from bed and board has passed.102  Those waiting periods, although 
shorter than the standard two year waiting period for a no-fault divorce,103 are 
particularly troubling in the case of an abusive marriage. 
During this period, the lives of everyone involved are on hold.  Neither partner 
may go forward and remarry, and the partners may not temporarily reconcile 
without erasing all of the time accrued under the statutory waiting period.  
Furthermore, this waiting period offers the abuser the opportunity to 
manipulate and harass the victim for an additional [time period]. 
Moreover, these potential effects of delay increase the danger that a 
psychologically damaged and frail person might decide that it is easier to return 
to the unhealthy marriage than to endure the [applicable] separation period.104 
Commentators have identified another problem with a fault-based divorce 
regime regarding when the statutory fault grounds have been met.  Courts have 
experienced significant difficulty determining the meaning of such terms as 
adultery and cruelty given the multiplicity and variety of fact patterns with 
which they have been forced to deal.105  Furthermore, difficult questions 
regarding the meaning of certain fault-based terms and issues as to whether the 
fault grounds can be proved in a particular case have driven up litigation 
 
 98. Carriere, supra note 96, at 137. 
 99. Id. at 141. 
 100. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307(B) (2000). 
 101. Carriere, supra note 96, at 1725–26. 
 102. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 104. Daniel W. Olivas, Tennessee Considers Adopting the Louisiana Covenant Marriage Act: A Law 
Waiting to Be Ignored, 71 TENN. L. REV. 769, 791 (2004). 
 105. Carriere, supra note 96, at 1708–09. 
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expenses and significantly protracted the divorce process.106  Protracting the 
process is, of course, one of the key points of covenant marriage.  The hope is 
that by slowing down the process considerably the spouses will decide to 
reconcile before the final divorce judgment.  In abusive marriages, this delay 
simply extends the time for the abuser to continue victimizing the other spouse, 
and reconciliation is hardly the desired result.  But even where abuse is not a 
factor, utilizing fault grounds for this purpose will have the undesirable effect of 
ratcheting up the acrimony between the spouses.107 
Encouraging fault litigation can harden attitudes of self-righteous defensiveness, 
contempt for the spouse, and vindictiveness that may contribute to the 
breakdown of the marriage, regardless of the specific fault ground on which 
divorce is brought.  It also discourages reconciliation; partners who are 
marshaling evidence against one another of fundamental violations of the 
marital understanding, and accusing each other of these in the public records, 
are more likely to nurse a sense of grievance and less likely to be in a mood to 
resume the marital life together than those who are merely living separate and 
apart.108 
Increasing the cost of divorce is a particularly egregious result that should 
be avoided to the extent possible.  Litigation is an enormously expensive process 
for all parties, but it creates hardships particularly for spouses litigating a 
divorce.  Financial difficulties are a major cause of divorce in the first place.109  
Divorce costs consume critical financial resources that spouses need for living 
expenses for themselves and their children.  The aggregate cost of living for the 
spouses as a whole increases significantly after divorce because they now must 
support two households.  The financial effects of divorce are often particularly 
burdensome for women.  Studies have concluded that divorced women and 
their children experience a significant decline in their standard of living in the 
first year after divorce, while divorced men experience a significant increase.110 
b.   The Counseling Requirements 
Another major criticism of the covenant marriage laws has been the 
counseling requirements.  As stated above, the Louisiana statute requires that a 
couple desiring to enter a covenant marriage must attest that they have received 
premarital counseling regarding the nature, purpose and responsibility of 
marriage, and they have committed themselves to take all reasonable efforts to 
preserve the marriage, which include marital counseling if necessary.111 
The Louisiana statute originally required that counseling also include a 
discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a covenant 
 
 106. Id. at 1722. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1723–24. 
 109. Margaret M. Mahoney, Debts, Divorce and Disarray in Bankruptcy, 73 UMKC L. REV. 83, 91 
(2004). 
 110. VanSickle, supra note 43, at 169. 
 111. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (2000). 
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marriage.112  This requirement has been heavily criticized primarily on grounds 
that the persons authorized by the statute to provide the counseling had no legal 
training and were wholly unqualified to provide any such legal advice.113  In 
addition, this requirement prompted the Catholic Church to refuse to require 
that couples seeking to marry in the church choose covenant marriage,114 
reasoning that “[a]ny discussion of divorce ‘would confuse or obscure the 
integrity’ of church teaching on the permanence of marriage.”115  The Church 
also “prohibit[ed] their counselors from discussing this issue with couples.”116  
The Louisiana statute was amended in 1999 to eliminate this requirement and 
was replaced with an obligation that the couple attest in their affidavit that they 
have “received and read the informational pamphlet developed and 
promulgated by the [O]ffice of the [A]ttorney [G]eneral entitled ‘Covenant 
Marriage Act’ which provide[d] a full explanation of the terms and conditions of 
a covenant marriage.”117  The Arizona118 and Arkansas119 covenant marriage 
statutes continue to include the requirement that counseling include a 
discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a covenant marriage 
by divorce. 
The principal criticism of the counseling requirements focuses on the 
statute’s silence regarding the amount and quality of counseling a couple must 
receive.  The topics required to be included in the premarital counseling are 
extremely general and vague, and there is no indication of how many hours of 
counseling are required.  It has been suggested that the premarital counseling 
requirements are so ambiguous as to be rendered meaningless.120  Further, 
although the statute lists categories of persons who are allowed to provide the 
counseling, it requires no particular qualifications.  As a result, the premarital 
counseling requirement “may be reduced to an empty formality.”121  The 
absence of any meaningful requirements regarding the counseling aspects of the 
covenant marriage statutes was apparently intentional to “avoid serious 
objections from those issued an invitation to assist in preserving marriages[;]”122 
however, it is hardly a justification for including statutory counseling 
requirements that are virtually worthless.  If premarital counseling has any real 
value, the statute should require real counseling that is designed to achieve the 
desired results.123 
 
 112. Carriere, supra note 96, at 1707. 
 113. Id. at 1708–09. 
 114. Id. at 1708. 
 115. Nichols, supra note 78, at 955. 
 116. Id. 
 117. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 273(A)(2)(a) (2000). 
 118. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (2000). 
 119. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-804(2)(B). 
 120. Carriere, supra note 96, at 1705. 
 121. Id. at 1708. 
 122. Olivas, supra note 104, at 789. 
 123. See infra pp. 29−30, proposing requirements for premarital counseling. 
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The concept of making premarital counseling a requirement or at least an 
option  before couples receive a marriage license is hardly novel.124  There are 
two basic propositions that can be advanced for requiring premarital 
counseling.  First, appropriate premarital counseling will better prepare couples 
for the realities of marriage and the issues they will inevitably face.  That 
preparation will give them a greater chance at a successful marriage, and allow 
them to build a stronger foundation for their marriage before it even begins.  
Ultimately, the number of marriages that end in divorce will be reduced because 
“offering couples a realistic picture of love, marriage, and their future 
companion . . . provides couples with the opportunity to ‘test’ their marriage 
before it begins (or ends).  The inevitable result is a stronger marriage, and 
consequently lower divorce rates.”125  Second, appropriate premarital 
counseling will force couples who are ill-suited to acknowledge  their 
differences, and possibly decide to avoid entering into a problematic marriage 
that might eventually end in divorce.  As Tony Perkins, the lead sponsor of 
Louisiana’s covenant marriage legislation explained, deciding whether to enter 
into a covenant marriage 
requires a couple to stop in the midst of a process that is driven by feeling and 
emotion to have a discussion about the depth of their marital commitment.  
Some couples may have their first and last argument over whether to [enter into 
a covenant marriage].  In my view avoiding a bad marriage is just as good as 
creating a good marriage.  [Discussing whether to enter into a covenant 
marriage] will prevent a number of broken homes because the couple will part 
ways when they cannot agree on the depth of their marital commitment.126 
The basic question is whether requiring premarital counseling will achieve 
either of those two goals to any measurable extent.  There are examples where 
premarital counseling, appropriately structured, has successfully achieved at 
least some of the above-described objectives.  One particularly noteworthy 
example involves a Maryland organization named Marriage Savers, which “has 
established community-wide marriage policies and provides premarital 
education programs to prepare engaged couples for a lifelong marriage 
commitment, as well as marriage mentoring programs for couples in troubled 
marriages.”127  The programs are church-based and clergy in a particular 
community agree to require participation by couples they marry.128  The 
program involves a 
4-month marriage preparation course, which includes religious teachings; a 
premarital assessment of the couple’s individual opinions on significant issues, 
such as finances and childrearing, by using premarital inventory like PREPARE 
 
 124. See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, A Comparative Survey of Covenant Marriage Proposals in the 
United States, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 31, 36 (1999–2000) (discussing legislation enacted in Florida 
dealing with the optional availability of premarital counseling); Carriere, supra note 96, at 1706–07 
(discussing unsuccessfully proposed legislation in Michigan requiring premarital counseling). 
 125. Flory, supra note 96, at 146. 
 126. Nichols, supra note 78, at 446. 
 127. Nicole Licata, Should Premarital Counseling Be Mandatory as a Requisite to Obtaining a Marriage 
License?, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 518, 523 (2002). 
 128. Id. 
MUSSELMAN__FMT1.DOC 1/21/2009  12:41:44 PM 
54 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 16:37 2009 
and FOCCUS; mentoring from married couples; a program that guides couples 
through the first years of marriage; and also a program to strengthen existing 
marriages.129 
Marriage Savers programs and community-wide policies have been 
adopted in more than 135 cities and have resulted in a dramatic reduction in the 
number of divorces.130  Modesto, California was the first city to adopt a 
premarital counseling requirement using a Marriage Savers program, after 
which “the divorce rate plummeted 47.6%.”131  Subsequently, Marriage Savers 
programs were adopted in other cities with similar results, including El Paso, 
Texas; Kansas City, Kansas; Charleston, West Virginia; Fairfield, Connecticut; 
Harrisonburg, Virginia; and Jamestown, New York.132 
In addition to Marriage Savers, premarital counseling programs that have 
achieved some degree of success include: “Practical Application of Intimate 
Relationship Skills (PAIRS); Prevention and Relationship Enhancement Program 
(PREP); Save Your Marriage Before It Starts (SYMBIS); and Relationship 
Enhancement (RE).”133  Professor of psychology David Olson at the University 
of Minnesota has developed a program entitled “Premarital Personal and 
Relationship Evaluation” (PREPARE) which includes a psychological test he 
calls a “premarital inventory” composed of “one hundred and twenty-five 
questions on personal values and perceptions; its purpose is ‘to unearth issues 
that don’t come up during courtship.’  It is so revealing that ten percent of the 
couples who take it decide against marrying one another.”134  Professor Olson’s 
program also requires “a waiting period of four months before the wedding.”135 
A number of studies and surveys have been conducted regarding the 
effectiveness of premarital counseling programs.  The authors of one study 
found that participants in a premarital counseling program were “half as likely 
to get divorced within five years of marriage.”136  Another study “found that 
within the first 4 years of marriage, 80% of the individuals surveyed reported 
the counseling as valuable to the strength and duration of their marriage.”137 
To achieve the desired goals, the quality and duration of premarital 
counseling is undeniably important.  Couples in love and on the brink of 
marriage are typically overly optimistic, idealistic and naïve and are generally 
not thinking about the issues they will face once married.  Premarital counseling 
should offer a more realistic picture by bringing these couples to terms with 
 
 129. Id. (explaining that “PREPARE and FOCCUS” are research-based inventories of 
compatibility for marriage.  These assessments help couples improve their relationship by getting 
them to discuss potential areas of conflict). Id. at 523 n.56. 
 130. Id. at 523. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  (describing statistics provided by the founder and President of Marriage Savers 
emphasizing that “he has not tracked the couples that actually participated in Marriage Savers.  
Therefore, the data are based on general marital statistics in the community irrespective of the 
couple’s participation in premarital counseling programs.”). 
 133. Flory, supra note 96, at 145. 
 134. Carriere, supra note 96, at 1707. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Licata, supra note 127, at 523. 
 137. Id. 
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many important issues requiring attention before the wedding.  Examples 
include: 
1. An analysis of each partner’s personality and a discussion of how differences 
identified in that analysis will be addressed and accommodated by each of 
them; 
2. An analysis of each partner’s communication style, and a discussion of the 
manner in which they intend to communicate with each other during the 
marriage; 
3. An analysis of the manner in which each partner resolves conflict in their 
lives, and a discussion of the manner in which they intend to resolve conflict in 
their marriage; 
4. A discussion of the individual needs of each partner, and the manner and 
frequency in which each partner expects those needs to be met; 
5. A discussion of the level of commitment to the marriage that each partner 
expects of the other; 
6. An analysis of each partner’s sexual expectations, and a discussion of how 
differences identified in that analysis will be addressed and accommodated by 
each of them; 
7. A discussion of whether each partner desires to have children.  If both 
partners desire to have children, then they should fully discuss all issues with 
regard to parenting them, including discipline, education, religion, health and 
finance; 
8. An analysis of the manner in which each partner views relationships with 
extended family members, and a discussion of how differences in that analysis 
will be addressed and accommodated by each of them; 
9. An analysis of the manner in which each partner views relationships with 
friends, and a discussion of how differences in that analysis will be addressed 
and accommodated by each of them; 
10. A discussion of financial issues that will arise during the marriage.  This 
should include a discussion of each partner’s expectations with regard to 
whether one or both of them will be responsible for managing their finances 
after marriage, and whether one or both of them will be responsible for 
providing the financial resources required by the family.  The partners should 
fully disclose to each other their current financial status, including the source 
and amount of income, and all assets and liabilities.  Ideally, the couple should 
jointly complete a financial management course to prepare them for all the 
financial issues and problems that will inevitably arise during their marriage; 
11. An analysis of each partner’s religious beliefs, and a discussion of how 
differences identified in that analysis will be addressed and accommodated by 
each of them; 
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12. An analysis of the physical and mental health of each partner, and a 
discussion of how any issues identified will affect their relationship and 
marriage.  With regard to mental health, many couples enter marriage with one 
or both of them having unresolved childhood issues that detrimentally affect 
their relationship with their spouse, oftentimes even explaining why they chose 
that person as a future spouse in the first place.  In many cases, individual 
therapy prior to the marriage for a partner with those issues would be extremely 
beneficial, either to assist the partner in having a healthy relationship with his 
spouse; or to assist the partner in determining that, because of those issues, the 
person he chose as a future spouse is not a good match for him, thereby 
avoiding entering into a problem marriage in the first place. 
The covenant marriage laws are on the right track by requiring premarital 
counseling, but they must go much further in specifying both the amount and 
quality of counseling and the requisite qualifications of counselors.  First, the 
covenant marriage laws should provide at minimum for a specific counseling 
program that would be designed by a committee of highly qualified, state-
appointed, professional marriage counselors and mental health professionals.  A 
financial management course should be required in addition to the counseling.  
In appropriate cases, when counselors determine that one or both partners have 
unresolved personal issues or mental health concerns that might detrimentally 
affect the marriage or relationship of the partners, they should be required to 
refer a partner for individual therapy and to suspend the counseling process 
until the partner has appropriately addressed the issues identified.  The 
program should be subject to revision from time to time as may be necessary. 
Second, there should be a minimum number of hours required to 
successfully complete the program and which should be sufficiently substantial 
to meaningfully cover all of the required topics.  The counseling should be 
provided at set intervals over a significant period of time, preferably at least six 
months, to allow for appropriate discussion and reflection during the periods 
between counseling sessions. 
Finally, persons providing counseling should have obtained the minimum 
level of education appropriate to the degree of services rendered.  The financial 
issues associated with such an extensive premarital counseling requirement can 
be addressed by implementing a fee schedule used by counselors.  The fees can 
be set on a sliding scale based on a couple’s income, if necessary. 
Covenant marriage laws have also been criticized for requiring that couples 
seek counseling whenever marital difficulties arise.  Specifically, the Louisiana 
statute provides that a couple entering a covenant marriage must commit to 
taking all reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, including marital 
counseling.138  As with the premarital counseling requirement, the statute is 
silent as to the amount and quality of counseling that the couple must receive.139  
In addition, the statute makes no attempt to define any terms, such as “marital 
 
 138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (2000). 
 139. See Olivas, supra note 104, at 790 (stating that the statute does not specify who will provide 
the counseling, the required content of the counseling, or for how long the counseling must be 
continued). 
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difficulties” or “reasonable efforts.”140  As a practical matter, these provisions are 
best viewed as a course of conduct to which a covenant marriage couple agrees 
to aspire. 
The marital counseling provisions have been heavily criticized even when 
viewed in the most favorable light.  A principal criticism is that the inclusion of 
these provisions in the statute implies that they may somehow be enforced.  
Courts could most efficiently enforce these provisions by forcing couples who 
have filed a divorce action to participate in some form of marital counseling.141  
However, various authors have questioned the value of forcing couples into 
“coercive” marital counseling.142  If the goal is reconciliation, both marital 
partners must fully participate in good faith in the counseling effort.  Professor 
Carriere supports that argument by citing previously unsuccessful efforts in Los 
Angeles and New Jersey in the 1950s, which required marital counseling prior to 
obtaining a divorce with the stated goal of reconciliation.143  The New Jersey 
experiment “ended with a failure rate of 97.3 percent.”144 
One particularly compelling criticism of the marital counseling 
requirements relates to statistics showing that many marriages ending in 
divorce involve domestic violence.145  Professor Carriere cites Martha Mahoney’s 
estimate that “domestic violence is an experience common to ‘[u]p to one half of 
all American women—and approximately two thirds of women who are 
separated or divorced.’”146  An abused spouse is particularly vulnerable when 
separating from her abuser or filing for divorce.147  The Louisiana covenant 
marriage statute originally contained no exemption in the marital counseling 
provisions for abused or battered spouses.148  Requiring abused spouses to 
engage in marital counseling with their abusers makes little sense and creates 
potentially tragic results.  In such a case, reconciliation is impossible and would 
be wholly undesirable from any perspective.  Professor Carriere argues that 
requiring a battered spouse to comply with a counseling requirement could put 
such spouse at great risk of harm: seeking counseling could be interpreted by 
the batterer spouse as an imminent departure by the battered spouse; it would 
be impossible for the battered spouse to keep her intentions to file for divorce 
secret; and the counseling would permit the batterer spouse continued contact 
with the battered spouse and increase the possibility that the battered spouse 
will be located.  Professor Carriere points to the Post-Separation Family Violence 
 
 140. See id. at 789–90 (asserting that couples must decide for themselves when their marriage is in 
such a state that marital counseling is required, and how much effort to save their marriage is 
reasonable). 
 141. See Carriere, supra note 96, at 1711 (noting that other methods of enforcement, such as an 
action in contract filed by one spouse against the other, would be problematic at best). 
 142. E.g., id. at 1712. 
 143. See id. at 1712–13 (suggesting that requiring couples to engage in counseling before a 
divorce could be granted serves no benefit in most cases, other than possibly assuring them that 
there is no hope of reconciliation, thereby helping them adjust to their divorce). 
 144. Id. at 1713. 
 145. See id. at 1714. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1714–15. 
 148. Id. at 1715–16. 
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Relief Act, which exempts victims of family violence from court-ordered 
mediation, as a model for adoption in the covenant marriage law.149  
Consequently, the statute was appropriately amended in 2004 to provide that 
marital counseling is not required “when the other spouse has physically or 
sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the 
spouses.”150 
c.   Other Criticisms 
Although the divorce and counseling provisions have produced the most 
criticism, covenant marriage laws have been criticized in various other ways.  
Some commentators have praised the enactment of covenant marriage laws as 
an alternate form of marriage and the subsequent establishment of a two-tiered 
marriage system in the adopting states.151  Even so, some of these commentators 
lament that couples will likely feel coerced into choosing a covenant marriage 
over the standard form.152  One author suggests that 
couples deciding on the type of marriage that best suits them may be vulnerable 
to internal pressure that one person places upon the other to select a covenant 
marriage.  For example, one partner might frame the choice as proof of the 
depth of love between them or as a test of the other partner’s degree of 
commitment. . . . Therefore, the desire of one partner for a standard 
arrangement may signal doubts to the other about the marriage as a whole.153 
The implication is that the partner desiring the standard form of marriage 
will instead be coerced by his partner into a covenant marriage.  In addition, “a 
couple’s choice may be strong-armed by the religious community. . . .  Some 
members of the clergy may refuse to perform standard marriages, forcing 
couples involved in a particular church to choose a covenant marriage or go 
elsewhere to have a ceremony.”154  Finally, couples may feel pressure to choose a 
covenant marriage if they perceive that the covenant marriage laws “devalue or 
stigmatize standard marriage.”155  One author opines that “[t]his is perhaps the 
ugliest aspect of the law.  By creating a separate class of marriage, the Act 
expressly endorses the policy of grading the sanctity of matrimony and fosters 
by implication the notion that some bonds are holier, godlier, or more 
courageous than others.”156  These concerns are exacerbated by the risk that 
couples choosing covenant marriage will not have sufficient legal information, 
 
 149. Id. at 1716–17. 
 150. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.307(D) (2000). 
 151. See, e.g., Olivas, supra note 104, at 784 (suggesting that allowing couples to choose between 
covenant marriage and regular marriage is appealing to both supporters and critics of covenant 
marriage); Nichols, supra note 82, at 454 (suggesting that the strongest argument in favor of the 
covenant marriage law is that it is not mandatory). 
 152. See id. at 454–55 (suggesting that an individual may be pressured into choosing covenant 
marriage by his intended spouse or by religious leaders). 
 153. Olivas, supra note 104, at 784–85. 
 154. Id. at 785.  See also Nichols, supra note 78, at 454–55. 
 155. Olivas, supra note 104, at 785.  See also Nichols, supra note 78, at 449. 
 156. Olivas, supra note 104, at 786. 
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particularly with regard to the divorce provisions of the legislation, to make a 
fully informed choice.157 
These criticisms miss the point altogether.  As for one partner pressuring 
the other into a covenant marriage, that is precisely one of the principal goals of 
the legislation.  To emphasize Tony Perkins’ explanation (quoted above) of the 
covenant marriage legislation in Louisiana, deciding whether to enter into a 
covenant marriage forces a couple in the midst of the highly emotional process 
of planning their wedding and finalizing their marriage to have a deep and 
meaningful discussion regarding the level of commitment they desire to make to 
each other; that discussion may result in a decision not to marry if they are 
unable to agree on that issue, which would be a desirable result if it prevents a 
subsequent divorce.158  As for the religious community strong-arming couples 
into choosing covenant marriage, one must first consider whether a religious 
organization encouraging its members to follow the organization’s teachings is 
classifiable as “strong arming.”  If so, then of course that is what will happen.  
No one is required to belong to a particular religious organization or be married 
in a particular church.  If some members of the clergy refuse to perform 
standard marriages, then a couple choosing that form of marriage will simply 
have to be married elsewhere.  As for covenant marriage laws devaluing or 
stigmatizing standard marriage, that may or may not be the result, depending 
on society’s constantly evolving views toward marriage in general.  It is just as 
likely that society may place a higher value on standard marriage than on 
covenant marriage, or even place a higher value on avoiding marriage 
altogether.159 
The covenant marriage laws have often been criticized simply because they 
have not proven to be popular.  Thus far, relatively few couples have opted  for 
covenant marriage in the states that have adopted it.160  A study conducted in 
1998 surveyed a random sample of Louisiana residents regarding, among other 
issues, their “knowledge of and perceived effects of covenant marriage.”161  The 
authors found that 
[v]ery few couples choose covenant marriage.  The public knows relatively little 
about the law and the clerks and their staff only partially implement the law as 
originally envisioned. 
 
 157. See id. at 786–88 (discussing the failure of the Louisiana covenant marriage law to require 
that a legal professional explain the legal consequences of covenant marriage to couples considering 
that option). 
 158. Nichols, supra note 78, at 446. 
 159. As discussed above, couples are increasingly choosing cohabitation over marriage.  See supra 
notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Cynthia DeSimone, Covenant Marriage Legislation: How the Absence of Interfaith Religious 
Discourse Has Stifled the Effort to Strengthen Marriage, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 391, 419–20 (2003) (citing 
statistics reflecting that, in Louisiana, no more than three percent of couples marrying during the 
first two years after the effective date of the covenant marriage legislation chose covenant marriage; 
in Arizona, only about four percent of marrying couples chose covenant marriage). 
 161. Laura Sanchez, et al., The Implementation of Covenant Marriage in Louisiana, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 192, 198 (2001). 
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Proponents want the covenant marriage law to force every young couple to 
consider the question, “Are you serious about this marriage or not?”  In practice, 
this happens only rarely.  Unless couples come to the clerks’ office armed with 
knowledge and intent, all they will usually hear about covenant marriage is that 
it is not something they are likely to be interested in.162 
The authors suggest that covenant marriage is not likely to catch on in 
Louisiana unless the state does a better job educating the public about the law 
and effectively trains staff in the clerks’ offices to explain the covenant marriage 
option.163 
Feminist scholars have been particularly vitriolic in criticizing the covenant 
marriage laws.  Professor VanSickle asserts that covenant marriage imposes 
“anti-feminist limitations upon the ability to seek and obtain a divorce [that] 
serve to catapult women back into positions of subordination to and financial 
dependence upon men.”164  She argues that the introduction of no-fault divorce 
laws “forced women to become better educated, more marketable, and 
consequently, more financially independent.  To revert to a traditional, fault-
based divorce system would encourage women to resume traditional gender 
roles, which emphasize the financial dependence of women on their spouses.”165  
As a result, “covenant marriage laws are anti-feminist in their conception and 
application.  Indeed, they are infantilizing to women and cast them into a place 
of perpetual subordination.”166 
Professor VanSickle also criticizes the religious underpinnings to the 
covenant marriage laws.  She argues that covenant marriage is a dangerous 
impediment to women’s attempts to escape the stigma associated with western 
religions, particularly Christianity, and their “fundamental belief in the 
necessity of female submission to male dominance.”167  Professor VanSickle uses 
examples from the Bible to assert that western religions treat women as “inferior 
and impressionable creatures that require the guidance of men.”168  The 
implication is that marriage laws based on these teachings are unacceptably 
sexist and paternalistic, and do great harm to advances made by women in their 
long and painful “uphill battle toward gender equality.”169 
3. Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Should the covenant marriage laws be embraced as the cure-all to society’s 
marriage-related ills, or should the entire concept of covenant marriage be 
rejected as an ill-conceived notion that creates more problems than it solves?  
Over the course of history, marriage has always been deeply entangled with 
human relationships, family values and expectations, religious beliefs, and 
 
 162. Id. at 222. 
 163. Id. at 222–23. 
 164. VanSickle, supra note 43, at 156. 
 165. Id. at 159 (quoting Nicole D. Lindsey, Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of “I Do,” an Analysis of 
the Ever-Changing Paradigm of Divorce, 9 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 265, 280 (1998)). 
 166. VanSickle, supra note 43, at 160. 
 167. Id. at 163. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 178. 
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societal traditions and customs.  As such, it is easily one of the most convoluted 
and problematic social issues in today’s society.  It is unsurprising that so much 
disagreement exists over what form or forms of marriage should be available 
under our laws.  It is this article’s contention that the concept of covenant 
marriage is an essential ingredient to the law of marriage in the United States, 
and that enactment of the covenant marriage statutes that presently exist in 
Louisiana, Arizona and Arkansas is a good start in developing that concept; 
however, many of the criticisms described above are valid and compelling.  It is 
now time to take the next step by amending these laws to further develop 
covenant marriage and address these criticisms while at the same time reaching 
higher to establish an elevated standard for marriage.  This standard should 
effectively account for the spiritual, physical, emotional, financial, and legal 
components that the union of two separate lives represents. 
Especially compelling are the criticisms of the divorce provisions of the 
covenant marriage laws.  The fault-based divorce laws of the past failed 
miserably for all the reasons stated above.170  Returning to a system that we 
already know cannot work would be ludicrous and is certainly no path to 
progress.  New pathways must be found to achieve the ideals of the covenant 
marriage laws while leaving the divorce provisions of current law generally 
intact.  The counseling provisions of the covenant marriage laws provide the 
best opportunity for achieving this objective. 
As stated earlier, requiring premarital counseling is aimed at achieving two 
basic goals.  First, appropriate premarital counseling will better prepare couples 
for the realities of marriage and the issues they will inevitably face, thereby 
allowing them to build a stronger foundation for their marriage and increasing 
the chances that the marriage will be successful.  Second, appropriate premarital 
counseling will force couples who are ill-suited for each other to come face to 
face with their differences, and possibly decide to avoid altogether entering into 
a problematic marriage that might eventually end in divorce. 
The problem with the covenant marriage legislation currently in effect is 
that the premarital counseling requirements are woefully ineffective in 
achieving those goals.171  As discussed above, premarital counseling has been 
shown to be effective, but the counseling must be based on a carefully crafted 
program substantial enough to meaningfully address the multitude of issues 
couples face during marriage.172  Accordingly, this article argues that the 
covenant marriage laws should at minimum provide for a specific counseling 
program which would be designed by a committee of highly qualified, state-
appointed, professional marriage counselors and mental health professionals, 
and which would include the additional components discussed in Part III.B.2.b.  
In addition, there should be a minimum number of hours of counseling required 
to complete the program, which should sufficiently cover all of the required 
topics.  The counseling should be provided at set intervals over a significant 
period of time, preferably at least six months, to allow for appropriate 
discussion and reflection during the periods between the counseling sessions.  
 
 170. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 120−122 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 127−137 and accompanying text. 
MUSSELMAN__FMT1.DOC 1/21/2009  12:41:44 PM 
62 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 16:37 2009 
Finally, the persons authorized to provide the counseling should be required to 
have completed a minimum level of education appropriate to the counseling 
services being provided. 
Many of the criticisms of the post-marital counseling provisions of the 
covenant marriage laws are also valid.  As discussed above, the statute is silent 
with regard to the amount and quality of counseling that a couple must receive, 
and the statute makes no attempt to define many of the terms used.173  In 
addition, these provisions are difficult, if not impossible, to enforce and many 
have questioned the wisdom of forcing a married couple into counseling after 
significant marital difficulties have already surfaced.174 
Marital counseling would be more beneficial to couples before they begin 
experiencing significant marital difficulties.  Accordingly, the covenant marriage 
laws should require couples to participate in a minimum number of hours of 
counseling each year they are married.  The statute could provide several 
different options for a couple to satisfy this requirement, including traditional 
counseling provided by a qualified counselor, group counseling with other 
couples, marriage retreats, or the like.  The goal would be to enhance the 
couple’s communication skills regarding marital issues as they arise, rather than 
waiting for more serious difficulties that are more difficult to resolve.  
Counseling would also make it easier for couples to seek counseling at those 
times when they need it most. 
Enforcement issues would most certainly arise with respect to these 
requirements.  An approach that provides both a carrot and a stick might be 
more efficient than standard enforcement practices.  Many jurisdictions have 
some type of post-filing waiting period before a divorce can be obtained.175  The 
covenant marriage laws could shorten the waiting period for couples who could 
prove that they fully complied with the marital counseling provisions.  These 
couples could argue they addressed their marital issues as they arose and 
therefore require no additional counseling before they divorce.  They did their 
best to make the marriage work and complied with all statutory requirements 
designed to give them the best chance for marital success; the marriage simply 
did not work.  On the same theory, the covenant marriage laws could lengthen 
the waiting period for couples who could not prove that they fully complied 
with the marital counseling provisions.  Arguably, these couples need more time 
to sort out the emotional issues that led to their decision to divorce; some may 
ultimately decide they were too hasty in deciding to file a divorce petition.  
Couples entering into a covenant marriage should also not be allowed to simply 
discard the covenant when they have not completed the work during the 
marriage that the statute requires.  The statute should mandate completion of 
the work before the marriage is allowed to end.  If they effectively refuse by 
giving less than full participation to the marital counseling when they are finally 
forced to engage in it, they should at least be required to endure a longer 
waiting period before they are allowed to divorce.  If, as is often the case, that 
there is a “guilty” spouse and an “innocent” spouse, forcing the “innocent” 
 
 173. See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text. 
 175. See generally Nichols, supra note 78, at 419. 
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spouse to endure the longer waiting period along with the “guilty” spouse is not 
an unduly burdensome requirement because they both agreed to enter into a 
covenant marriage in the first place. 
Furthermore, another incentive could be provided by the covenant 
marriage laws to encourage couples to comply with the post-marital counseling 
provisions.  Financial incentives tend to be more effective than other types of 
incentives in encouraging human behavior.  States could provide some form of 
tax relief on an annual basis to those couples who can show that they fully 
complied with the marital counseling provisions each year of their marriage. 
An additional, compelling criticism of the post-marital counseling 
provisions focuses on the role of domestic violence in causing divorce.  The 
Louisiana covenant marriage statute originally provided no exemption from 
counseling for abused or battered spouses, although it was later amended to 
provide that marital counseling is not required in the case of physical or sexual 
abuse of the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses.176  The 
covenant marriage laws should clearly provide that the post-marital counseling 
provisions have no application to spouses who can make an adequate showing 
that they or their children have been subjected to any kind of abuse.  Domestic 
violence is simply intolerable either in covenant marriage or in any other legally 
recognized relationship. 
IV.  SHOULD SAME-SEX COUPLES BE ALLOWED TO MARRY? 
A. The Debate 
Whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry has become a hotly 
contested issue.  Proponents began challenging the constitutionality of state 
laws banning marriage between same-sex couples as early as the 1970s.177  They 
scored their first victory in Hawaii in 1993 when “the Supreme Court of Hawaii 
ruled that under the Hawaiian Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause a 
marriage license denial to a same-sex couple was presumptively 
unconstitutional unless the state established a compelling reason for the 
denial.”178  That victory was undone when the Hawaiian legislature amended 
the constitution to limit the definition of marriage to unions between a man and 
a woman.179  The legislature subsequently enacted legislation extending 
domestic partnership rights to same-sex couples, which gave them a limited 
form of marital rights.180 
 
 176. See supra notes 145–150 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Kindregan, supra note 7, at 36 (citing to decisions in Kentucky and Washington holding 
that those states were not constitutionally required to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples).  
See Jones v. Halliahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1974). 
 178. Id.  See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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An Alaskan court ruled in 1998 that the right of privacy guaranteed by the 
Alaska Constitution “gave same-sex couples the right to choose life partners.”181  
That decision, Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, was rendered moot when the 
legislature also amended the Alaska Constitution to limit the definition of 
marriage to relationships between a man and a woman.182  In 1999, the Supreme 
Court of Vermont held that the “state constitution required Vermont to provide 
qualified same-sex couples with the same legal benefits accorded to opposite-sex 
couples in marriage.  The Vermont legislature responded by authorizing same-
sex couples to enter civil unions, in which the partners enjoy a lengthy list of 
benefits previously available only to married couples.”183 
In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that “barring 
an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage 
solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the 
Massachusetts Constitution.”184  The decision paved the way for Massachusetts 
to become the first state to allow same-sex couples to marry pursuant to the 
general marriage law applicable to opposite-sex couples.  The court’s 
constitutional analysis centered on due process and equal protection principles 
as set forth in the Massachusetts Constitution185 and was based on the denial to 
same-sex couples of the “enormous private and social advantages” that 
marriage bestowed on opposite-sex couples who choose to marry.186  
Subsequently, New Jersey adopted a civil union statute granting same-sex 
couples all the rights and responsibilities of marriage except the title,187 and the 
Connecticut legislature granted same-sex couples the right to enter into civil 
unions.188 
Proponents of same-sex marriage have been extraordinarily diligent in 
advancing their cause in California.  In 1999, the California legislature enacted a 
domestic partnership law that allowed same-sex couples, and opposite-sex 
couples if at least one partner was more than sixty-two years of age, to establish 
domestic partnerships officially recognized by the State.189  Registering as 
domestic partners initially entitled a couple to some, but by no means all, of the 
state benefits enjoyed by married couples.190  This legislation was amended 
several times through 2007, to provide additional benefits to domestic partners 
 
 181. Id. at 37.  See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
 185. Id. at 953. 
 186. Id. at 954. 
 187. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 368. 
 188. Kindregan, supra note 7, at 38.  In addition, Maine and the District of Columbia have 
enacted legislation granting limited domestic partnership rights to same-sex couples.  See Knauer, 
supra note 2, at 1271 nn.58 and 62. 
 189. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 413 (Cal. 2008). 
 190. Id.  The legislation initially granted domestic partners certain specified hospital visitation 
privileges, and authorized the state to provide health benefits to domestic partners of some state 
employees.  Id. 
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and further equalize domestic partners with married couples.191  In 2003, the 
legislature substantially amended the domestic partnership law with the stated 
goal to provide domestic partners all of the legal rights and benefits available to 
married couples.192  Specifically, the legislation provided: 
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and 
benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties 
under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court 
rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of 
law, as are granted to or imposed upon spouses.193 
The Supreme Court of California has determined that the current effect of 
California’s domestic partnership law “generally afford[s] same-sex couples the 
opportunity to enter into a domestic partnership and thereby obtain virtually all 
of the benefits and responsibilities afforded by California law to married 
opposite-sex couples.”194  Nevertheless, on May 15, 2008 the Supreme Court of 
California significantly changed the legal landscape with regard to same-sex 
marriage by deciding In re Marriage Cases.195 The court held that California’s 
statutory provisions limiting the right to marry to opposite-sex couples violated 
the California Constitution.196  Along with Massachusetts, California became one 
of only two states allowing same-sex couples to marry pursuant to the general 
marriage law applicable to opposite-sex couples.  The court reasoned that the 
legislature’s distinction “between the name for the official family relationship of 
opposite-sex couples (marriage) and that for same-sex couples (domestic 
partnership)”197 and its exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of 
marriage impermissibly discriminated against same-sex couples on the basis of 
sexual orientation, which the court declared to be a suspect classification for 
purposes of constitutional analysis.  Furthermore, the exclusion “impinge[d] 
upon a same-sex couple’s fundamental interest in having their family 
relationship accorded the same respect and dignity enjoyed by an opposite-sex 
couple.”198  The court concluded that California’s marriage and domestic 
 
 191. Id. at 413–16.  In 2000, the legislature amended the statute to grant access to domestic 
partners to specially designed housing reserved for senior citizens.  Id. at 413–14.  In 2001, domestic 
partners were afforded numerous additional rights, “including the right to sue for wrongful death, 
to use employee sick leave to care for an ill partner or an ill child of one’s partner, to make medical 
decisions on behalf of an incapacitated partner, to receive unemployment benefits if forced to 
relocate because of a partner’s job, and to employ stepparent adoption procedures to adopt a 
partner’s child.”  Id. at 414.  In 2002, domestic partners were provided with the right to automatically 
inherit a portion of a deceased partner’s separate property (and certain other rights related to 
probate), and the right to receive paid family leave from their employment to care for an ill domestic 
partner.  Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 417–18.  Additional amendments were made in 2006 to equalize the rights of domestic 
partners and married couples with regard to state income taxes, and in 2007 to allow domestic 
partners the option of a name change in connection with the registration process.  Id. at 415–16. 
 195. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 196. Id. at 402. 
 197. Id. at 400. 
 198. Id. at 401. 
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partnership statutes violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the 
fundamental right to marry embodied in the California Constitution. 
Other states have taken the opposite approach.  A significant number of 
“states have amended their constitutions to limit marriage to heterosexual 
couples or to prohibit the recognition of marriages and civil unions entered into 
by same-sex couples in other states.”199  In addition, as proponents of same-sex 
marriage were making advances, opponents began to express concern regarding 
whether a same-sex marriage legal in one state would be entitled to recognition 
in the other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.200  Ultimately in 2006, Congress was pressured to enact the 
Defense of Marriage Act, which provided that 
no state, territory, possession or Indian tribe shall be required to give effect to 
any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex 
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.201 
A prodigious amount of commentary has been produced on both sides of 
this debate.  Following is a summary of the arguments, both pro and con, that 
have been most commonly offered. 
1. Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage and Rebuttals 
A refrain often heard in opposition to same-sex marriage is that marriage is 
and always has been defined as a union of one man and one woman.202  A 
corollary to that proposition is that expanding the definition of marriage to 
include same-sex couples would eliminate all previous marriage entrance 
requirements and open the floodgates to movements to expand the definition 
further to include “unions of three or more, of immediate family members, or 
(most absurdly) of people and members of different species.”203  Proponents of 
same-sex marriage respond that justifying the refusal to expand the definition of 
marriage through assertions that the current definition of marriage is limited to 
a union of one man and one woman utilizes circular logic.204  Justice Greaney 
stated in his concurring opinion in Goodridge, “[t]o define the institution of 
marriage by the characteristics of those to whom it always has been accessible, 
in order to justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been accessible, is 
conclusory and bypasses the core question we are asked to decide.”205  As for the 
assertion that expanding the definition of marriage would lead to the 
elimination of all entrance requirements for marriage, proponents respond that 
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expanding the definition to same-sex couples “does not open an unsealable rift 
through which every candidate for marriage could then pour.  If advocates of 
polygamy wish to make the case for recognition of unions of more than two 
persons, that issue should and must be addressed on its own terms.”206 
Several commentators have argued that same-sex couples should not be 
allowed to marry because homosexuals are “immoral, are incapable of 
maintaining stable relationships and are prone to communicating disease.”207  
Professor Lynn Wardle “asserts that homosexuals cannot enter successfully into 
marital relationships grounded on fidelity in light of statistics that gay people, 
particularly gay men, have many sexual partners, and that their intimate 
relationships are of relatively short duration.”208  Allowing homosexuals to 
marry, argues Professor Wardle, would denigrate the value of marriage in 
society and would “undermine existing and future marriages of heterosexuals 
or threaten family life.”209  Proponents of same-sex marriage disagree, of course, 
with the premise that homosexuality is immoral per se210 and object to 
stereotyping all gays and lesbians based on the conduct of some members of the 
group.211  They suggest that such conduct may in fact be the natural result of 
“the tremendous difficulty in sustaining relationships that receive almost no 
support from society at large and that many people, including a number of 
critics of same-sex marriage, actively will [these relationships] to fail.”212 
The argument that homosexuality is immoral is based in part on religious 
doctrine, specifically passages from the Bible that promote opposite-sex 
relationships and condemn homosexuality.213  Proponents of same-sex marriage 
have responded by asserting that government regulation of marriage should not 
be based on religious doctrine because the Constitution requires the separation 
of Church and State.214  However, some commentators have based the 
immorality argument not on the Bible but on “natural law” principles. 
The “natural law” position is mostly premised upon the notion of “the 
natural sexual complementarity of men and women,”215 which results in “‘a 
natural correspondence between the notion of marriage and the sexual coupling, 
the merging of bodies, in the “unitive significance” of marriage.’”216 
[Because] only the male/female pair can be sexually complementary, only such 
a union can realize the true, unifying goods of marriage. . . .  Members of the 
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same sex, by contrast, do not bring anything mutually complementary to sexual 
activity, so that their activity could just as well have been realized by either of 
the partners acting alone (i.e., masturbation).217 
Professor Teresa Collett defines “complementarity” as the “innate desire 
and unique capacity for union” of a man and a woman.218  She asserts that “[t]he 
willing joinder of [the] inherent differences [between a man and a woman] 
constitutes the mystery of marriage,” and that most heterosexual couples 
achieve their greatest fulfillment through marriage.219  She argues that same-sex 
couples could never achieve such fulfillment because “[w]hile same-sex unions 
contain some diversity, in that they involve two unique and distinctive persons, 
the differences are individual rather than inherent.”220  In contast to heterosexual 
couples, “[t]he similarities in a same-sex union weaken the union in the same 
manner that similarly formed pieces joined by adhesive are less durably 
connected than interlocking pieces of the same material joined by the same 
adhesive.”221 
Professor Sparling challenges Professor Collett’s view of complementarity 
by asserting that the concept can be understood to embrace a much broader 
realm than merely the differences between the sexes.  He observes that, “[g]iven 
that Professor Collett is heterosexual, it is hardly surprising that she views the 
male/female dichotomy as the catalyst that allows a man and a woman to 
achieve so complete a union in marriage,”222 and argues that complementarity is 
not so narrow a concept that it cannot be achieved by a same-sex couple in a 
different sense. 
For homosexuals, the spark that ignites and sustains our intimate relationships 
is fired not by gender differences, or even by individual differences, but rather 
by the force that emanates powerfully and mysteriously from the innate 
qualities of our own sex.  Because the sexual and spiritual desires of homosexual 
couples spring from their celebration of likeness, rather than difference, they 
experience total communion (the completeness that stands at the heart of 
complementarity) through the unique bond of man to man or woman to 
woman.  Thus, complementarity nurtures and sustains homosexual 
relationships just as it does heterosexual ones; it simply flows from a different 
source.  For many homosexuals, like their heterosexual brothers and sisters, this 
sense of being with one’s partner reaches its culmination in a relationship based 
on love and commitment or, more precisely, marriage.223 
Another argument commonly made by opponents to same-sex marriage is 
that the primary purpose of marriage is procreation, and same-sex couples lack 
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the biological capacity to reproduce.224  Proponents of same-sex marriage 
respond that many heterosexual couples marry with no plan—and often with no 
practical ability—to procreate.  Examples include couples who are elderly or 
those that are otherwise infertile.225  Goodridge similarly rejected this rationale 
when it stated: 
the state’s interest in regulating marriage is based on the traditional concept that 
marriage’s primary purpose is procreation.  This is incorrect.  Our laws of civil 
marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between married 
people above every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of 
creating a family.  [The state’s marriage statute] contains no requirement that 
the applicants for a marriage license attest to their ability or intention to 
conceive children by coitus.  Fertility is not a condition of marriage, nor is it 
grounds for divorce.  People who have never consummated their marriage, and 
never plan to, may be and stay married.226 
A particularly heated debate has also emerged over the effect that 
legalizing same-sex marriage would have on children.  Opponents of same-sex 
marriage assert that 
[t]he primary social function of marriage is rearing children. . . .  Not only do 
children need two parents; it also seems that ideally a child should have both a 
mother and a father. . . .  [I]t is reasonable to assume that children with both a 
mother and a father will learn better how to live in a world composed of males 
and females.”227 
Professor Wardle writes that “[h]eterosexual marriage provides the best 
environment into which children can be born and reared; the profound benefits 
of dual-gender parenting to model intergender relations and show children how 
to relate to persons of their own and the opposite gender are lost in same-sex 
unions.”228  Proponents of same-sex marriage vehemently disagree with those 
assertions.  They cite to various studies that show “no appreciable difference 
between children brought up in stable homosexual homes and those brought up 
in stable heterosexual ones,”229 although there is wide disagreement over the 
validity and proper interpretation of these studies.230  The court in Goodridge 
similarly rejected the proposition that “confining marriage to opposite-sex 
couples ensures that children are raised in the ‘optimal’ setting.”231  The court 
took note of the state’s concession that same-sex couples can be excellent 
parents, and stated that the exclusion of “same-sex couples from civil marriage 
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will not make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it does 
prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable 
advantages that flow from the assurance of” the kind of stable family structure 
associated with marriage.232 
2. Arguments For Same-Sex Marriage and Rebuttals 
Not all gays and lesbians embrace the concept of traditional marriage.  
Andrew Sullivan writes that the American gay rights movement initially 
rejected the concept of traditional marriage on grounds that it was an oppressive 
and sexist institution; its “goal was to weaken the institution as a whole, to 
subvert and undermine it, and to create alternative structures within which to 
explore homosexual desire, love, and family.”233 
The more recent trend has been to view marriage as the “linchpin of gay 
civil rights,”234 and to be supportive of “the many lesbian and gay couples who 
have sought the right to marry.”235 
Professor John Culhane asserts that the case for same-sex marriage is 
extraordinarily simple and clear.236  His position is that marriage enjoys almost 
universal support from all of society; it is “encouraged by family, friends, and 
community, financially supported by the government, and seen as a common 
incidence of citizenship.”237  It is “recognized by religious groups as well as the 
state.  The Supreme Court’s recognition of the fundamental nature of the right to 
marry reflects this view, which is as close to one of consensus as is likely in a 
democratic society.”238  He argues that the Supreme Court has ruled that 
prisoners, debtors, and interracial couples cannot be denied the right to marry, 
and the same treatment should apply with regard to same-sex couples.239  
According to Professor Culhane, 
[b]asic equality demands that people who identify themselves as being of same-
sex orientation be permitted entry into the institution of marriage.  By expressly 
disallowing same-sex unions, the state devalues the lives of its gay and lesbian 
citizens, denying their very citizenship in a vital respect that others take for 
granted.240 
Similar, sometimes even more emotional, appeals have been made for the 
right of gays and lesbians to marry.  Professor Sparling asserts that gay 
marriages are in actuality no different than their heterosexual counterparts; 
many gay and lesbian couples view their relationships as traditional marriages, 
committing themselves for life to monogamy and mutual support.241  He argues 
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that same-sex marriage is no different than opposite-sex marriage in the sense 
that in both instances marriage 
revitalizes the family through the inclusion of spouses who can create new 
bonds and strengthen existing ties.  These new sons and daughters-in-law may 
enhance the family in a material way by bringing talents that the family has 
heretofore lacked or by introducing the family to new opportunities for 
advancement.  Gay marriage, like different-sex marriage, can serve also as the 
wellspring for sustaining the family by raising another generation of children.  
Same-sex marriage carries great potential to enrich the family spiritually.  The 
gay marriage that is a model of love and commitment can serve as a powerful 
example to other family members, whether they are heterosexual or 
homosexual, married or unmarried, minors or of marriageable age. . . . 
Advocates of same-sex marriage view marriage as a dynamic and vital 
institution that is so deeply rooted in the human consciousness and the human 
sense of family that it can and should incorporate all members of the human 
race, homosexual as well as heterosexual, who share its ideals and accept its 
duties and responsibilities.  We deem the right to marry to be a basic human 
right, one which should no more distinguish on the basis of sexual orientation 
than on race or religion.  To deny gay people the right to marry is to deny a part 
of our humanity, to deprive us of the opportunity to achieve one of the 
pinnacles of human fulfillment, and to forswear our ability to participate most 
fully in family life.  This denial brands us as alien to the human family when, in 
fact, we are all in the family.242 
Opponents of same-sex marriage disagree with this basic premise that 
same-sex marriages are the functional equivalent of opposite-sex marriages.243  
Professor Wardle argues that 
[t]he nature of the relationship between two persons of the same sex is 
fundamentally different than the heterosexual relationship that is marriage.  
Certainly some other relationships can provide the setting for some type of 
intimacy, other relationships can provide for economic support of individuals, 
children can be propagated in other relationships, children can be raised in other 
environments, and so forth.  But no other companionate relationship provides 
the same great potential for benefiting individuals and society as the 
heterosexual covenant union we call marriage, and that is why committed 
heterosexual unions are given the legal status of marriage.244 
These conflicting arguments are advanced with equal passion and 
commitment on both sides of the debate, and are impossible to reconcile.  The 
side one chooses depends upon individual beliefs and value systems.  In the 
arena of public opinion, opponents of same-sex marriage will generally win out 
because of the overwhelming numerical advantage that opposite-sex couples 
hold over their same-sex counterparts.245 
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The more compelling argument in favor of same-sex marriage claims that 
denying same sex couples the right to marry violates the U.S. Constitution 
and/or the constitution of the applicable state.246  The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court adopted this view when it declared that “barring an individual 
from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because 
that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts 
Constitution.”247  The court focused its constitutional analysis on the due process 
and equal protection principles set forth in the Massachusetts Constitution.248 
Central to the Goodridge court’s decision were the “enormous private and 
social advantages” that marriage bestows on opposite-sex couples.249  The court 
identified a substantial number of tangible and intangible benefits that flow 
from marriage.250  Examples include: valuable property rights in the assets of the 
other partner to the marriage; tax advantages; the right to hold title to property 
in a tenancy by the entirety; enhanced homestead protection; inheritance rights; 
medical insurance benefits; alimony rights and the equitable division of marital 
property in the event of divorce; the right to bring claims for wrongful death 
and the loss of consortium; presumptions of legitimacy and parentage of 
children born to a married couple; and the application of predictable rules of 
child custody, visitation, support, and other issues involving children in the 
event of divorce.251  Children of married couples also receive special legal and 
economic protections that are unavailable to children of unmarried parents.  
Specifically, they benefit from the enhanced family stability and economic 
security associated with marriage; the societal approval attached to having 
married parents; and the greater accessibility to family-based federal and state 
benefits that results from the legal presumption of parentage of children born in 
wedlock.252 
In his concurrence, Justice Greaney argued that the marriage statutes did 
not violate the Massachusetts Constitution because they did not prevent gay 
individuals from marrying; they merely prevented gay individuals from 
marrying the person of their choice if that person was of the same sex.  These 
individuals were free to marry anyone who qualified under the statutes.253  The 
majority rejected that argument, holding that the statutes violated the 
Massachusetts Constitution because they prevented an individual desiring to 
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marry a person of the same sex from marrying the person of his choice.254  To 
support its reasoning, the Goodridge court cited to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia,255 which held that a statutory bar to 
interracial marriage violated the United States Constitution. Following the 
Supreme Court’s rationale, the Goodridge court then stated that “the right to 
marry means little if it does not include the right to marry the person of one’s 
choice, subject to appropriate government restrictions in the interests of public 
health, safety, and welfare.”256 
The court’s reasoning in Goodridge is highly persuasive.  Regardless of one’s 
value system, personal beliefs and feelings regarding homosexuality and gay 
marriage, it is extraordinarily difficult to make objective and persuasive counter 
arguments to the constitutional basis for the court’s decision.  Denying 
substantial rights and benefits to a class of individuals based solely on their 
choice of whom to marry would certainly seem to be constitutionally 
impermissible. 
Professor Wardle attempts to diminish the constitutional basis for same-sex 
marriage by asserting that 
homosexual behavior is not comparable to race as a basis for marriage 
regulations.  Race is unrelated to almost any legitimate purpose the law could 
have for distinguishing between two persons, especially irrelevant to the 
purposes of marriage; but homosexual behavior is directly related to the 
fundamental purposes of marriage laws—that is, the regulation of sexual 
behavior and protection of the mores that define the core identity, boundaries, 
and basic structure for the moral order of a society.  As General Colin Powell 
puts it: “Skin color is a benign non-behavioral characteristic.  Sexual orientation 
is perhaps the most profound of human behavioral characteristics.  Comparison 
of the two is a convenient but invalid argument.”257 
Professor Wardle thus argues that denying the rights and benefits of 
marriage to a class of individuals based on their behavior, as opposed to 
immutable characteristics like skin color, is constitutionally permissible.  For this 
argument even to be plausible, one would have to assume that the preference of 
gays and lesbians to form relationships with members of their own sex is based 
solely on their choice of how they wish to behave, rather than on biological 
factors.  Professor Wardle acknowledges that biological factors could possibly 
contribute to homosexual behavior;258 but even if that is false, justifying the 
denial of the right to marry a person of one’s choice and thus all the benefits that 
marriage offers on the perceived behavior of a class of individuals is irrational.  
No other class of individuals is denied the right to marry based on their 
behavior.  Professor Wardle is correct that the law should distinguish some 
legally recognized relationships from others based on behavioral factors, but 
any such distinction must not be the basis for affording greater rights and 
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benefits to one class of relationships than any other such class.  This issue will be 
further explored in Part V of this article. 
B. Responsive Proposals 
Massachusetts and California are the only states thus far to allow same-sex 
couples to marry pursuant to the general marriage law applicable to opposite-
sex couples.  Various commentators have made a number of proposals they 
believe would resolve the marriage debate, but would do so in some other 
manner. 
Some commentators propose creating a legally recognized status for same-
sex couples that would afford them all the rights and benefits that opposite-sex 
couples already enjoy under the current marriage laws.  That legally recognized 
status would exist alongside the current legal status of marriage, but would be 
called something other than marriage—such as “civil union.”259  This is the 
approach taken, at least to some degree, in several states including Vermont, 
New Jersey and Connecticut.260 
Opinions regarding the effectiveness of the civil union approach are mixed.  
Vermont enacted a civil union law that gives “same-sex couples all the rights, 
benefits, and responsibilities of marriage.  It treats same-sex couples as if they 
were married in every respect, from inception to dissolution, withholding only 
the word ‘marriage’ itself.”261  Although same-sex proponents in Vermont 
supported enactment of the legislation, they now feel short-changed, perhaps in 
part because of the subsequent adoption of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts 
and California.  As a result, they have renewed their fervor for the right to 
marry pursuant to the general marriage law applicable to opposite-sex 
couples.262  The principal criticism of civil unions is that they are viewed as 
discriminatory and “an unconstitutional ‘separate-but-equal’ regime akin to the 
Jim Crow laws struck down by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education 
and other cases.”263  This view is rejected by respected constitutional law 
scholars,264 but is at least indicative of the dissatisfaction of gay and lesbian 
couples with a multi-tiered approach that creates one status of legally 
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recognized relationships applied solely to them and another status applied 
solely to everyone else.  Even those advocating for civil unions do so primarily 
as a stepping-stone to full adoption of same-sex marriage.265 
Professor Greg Johnson would go even further with this approach and 
suggests that a couple could choose their form of legally recognized relationship 
from a “‘menu of options.’”266 
Some couples may want the handful of rights (such as health care benefits) and 
limited commitment that domestic partnership offers.  Others, who seek full 
commitment but chafe at the stale trappings of marriage, may opt for civil 
union.  Many couples would undoubtedly prefer traditional marriage, and some 
might even choose “covenant marriage.”267 
Professors Drobac and Page have taken a different approach, proposing 
that the legal status of marriage be entirely replaced with a new status bearing 
different nomenclature and creating different rules, rights and obligations than 
currently pertain to the status of marriage.268  They propose adoption of the 
“Uniform Domestic Partnership Act,” which 
would work (1) to secure the parentage and welfare of children (conceived of as 
analogous to limited partners), (2) to create an efficient and unified domestic 
economic enterprise, (3) to obtain legal rights and benefits based on a 
partnership status, and (4) to reduce the financial costs and mutual acrimony 
often associated with divorce.269 
This new law would create four different types of domestic partnerships: 
(1) the enduring domestic partnership, which is intended to continue until the 
death of one of the partners, but may be terminated earlier and applies to 
couples who intend to remain childless; (2) the provisional domestic 
partnership, which lasts for only one year, is renewable annually if the partners 
choose and is intended for couples who are not sure they want to commit to 
each other for life; (3) the filial domestic partnership, which is intended for 
couples who intend to raise children together; and (4) the caregiving domestic 
partnership, which is intended for couples who agree to divide income-earning 
and domestic caregiving tasks unequally.270  Any two adult persons may form 
any of these partnerships, with the proviso that “no one person may be in more 
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than one domestic partnership at a time.”271  The Act would provide specific 
rules regarding formation of a partnership; rights and obligations of the partners 
regarding the operation of a partnership; property rights with regard to 
partnership property; rights and obligations with regard to children; fiduciary 
obligations owed by partners to each other and to children; and termination of a 
partnership.272  Drobac and Page maintain that this model would “facilitate 
economic and strategic legal planning to benefit loving domestic partners, . . . 
satisfy constitutional strictures[,] and leave marriage to the exclusive control of 
the religious institutions.”273 
Some commentators advocate the abolition of marriage altogether, or at 
least abolition of the governmental regulation of marriage.  Professor Daniel 
Crane proposes that marriage be privatized wherein the state would step aside 
and allow couples to define and regulate their marriages by private contract.274  
His reasoning is theological; he argues that religious communities, by lobbying 
for a restrictive legal definition of marriage as protection against the inclusion of 
same-sex couples, “are implicitly acknowledging and confirming the state’s 
right to dictate the definition and contours of marriage.”275  He concludes that 
“marriage is the province of religious communities, not the state, and that 
empowering the state to define marriage uniformly not only profanes a holy 
institution but threatens the ultimate autonomy and authority of religious 
communities with respect to marriage.”276 
Professor Edward Zelinsky proposes that civil marriage be abolished:277  
“The law should not define, regulate, or recognize marriage.  Marriage—the 
structured, publicly-proclaimed, communally-supported, relationship of mutual 
commitment—should become solely a religious and cultural institution with no 
legal definition or status.”278  He offers three reasons for deregulating marriage.  
First, he asserts that marriage in our society has functionally changed and now 
plays a different role than in the past.  Because the legal doctrines governing 
married couples are increasingly applied to both married and unmarried 
couples, marriage is becoming unnecessary as a separate legal category.279  
Second, he makes a law and economics argument and states that “abolishing 
civil marriage would strengthen marriage by ending the government’s legal 
monopoly in defining that institution; this would encourage a productive 
competition among alternative versions of marriage.”280  He argues that once the 
state removes itself from the business of recognizing, defining and regulating 
marriage, various competitive forms of marriage will emerge and only the best 
of such forms will survive.281  Traditional religions would have an equal 
 
 271. Id. at 402. 
 272. Id. at 406–17. 
 273. Id. at 402. 
 274. Crane, supra note 2, at 1259. 
 275. Id. at 1222. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 1163. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 1163–64. 
 281. Id. at 1164. 
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opportunity to convince couples that their form of marriage is the best.282  Third, 
abolishing civil marriage would fully and finally resolve the debate with regard 
to same-sex marriage.283 
If some people believe that gay marriage is an ethical imperative while others 
believe that it is a serious moral error, one or the other group will be 
disappointed, if not aggrieved, by a single legal definition of marriage.  
However, each group can promulgate its own definition of marriage in a world 
with no civil marriage, a world in which the law does not define, recognize, or 
regulate marriage.284 
V.  PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
“The law that will work is merely the summing up in legislative form of the 
moral judgment that the community has already reached.” 
Woodrow Wilson, American President (1856–1924) 
In spite of assertions to the contrary,285 the state has compelling reasons to 
regulate relationships between couples: 
[w]ithout question, civil marriage enhances the “welfare of the community.”  It 
is a “social institution of the highest importance.”  Civil marriage anchors an 
ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones.  It is 
central to the way the [state] identifies individuals, provides for the orderly 
distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and 
supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds, and tracks 
important epidemiological and demographic data.286 
Discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Zablocki v. Redhail,287 the 
Goodridge court asserted that, “[a]s a practical matter, the State could not abolish 
civil marriage without chaotic consequences.”288  This statement is particularly 
poignant when considering Professor Wardle’s description of the official state 
effort in Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which radically 
transformed and de-privileged the institution of marriage.289  As quoted by 
Professor Wardle in his article: 
“Soviet social reconstruction was paid for in the coin of individual suffering and 
broken families.”  For some subgroups of Russian society, especially some 
“peasants, family life often simply ceased to exist.”  After the Revolution, 
“moral decline and psychological excesses developed which ‘further deepened 
 
 282. See id. (asserting that traditional religions could prove to offer the most appealing choice 
and thus emerge as the big winner). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See supra notes 274−280 and accompanying text, arguing for the deregulation of marriage by 
the state. 
 286. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003). 
 287. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 288. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957 n.14. 
 289. Wardle, supra note 3.  See also supra notes 56−77 and accompanying text. 
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the disorganization of the family . . . and [created] economic hardships,’ and in 
marital family relations” reduced the family to a condition lower than had 
“existed in Tsarist Russia.”290 
Which relationships to include in the regulatory scheme of civil marriage is 
the object of debate.  It is not possible to reach a consensus with regard to a 
universal definition of a legally recognized relationship that would replace the 
current status of marriage.  At the same time, both sides of the marriage debate 
appear woefully unhappy with the current state of affairs.  Regardless of 
whether the status of marriage is modified in some particular way or remains 
the same, a substantial number of people are going to feel that their personal 
sense of morals, ethics and beliefs have been violently offended, and are going 
to be significantly unhappy with the result.  If effective change is to be achieved, 
it will have to be based on a multi-faceted approach that provides for more than 
one legally recognized relationship that couples may enter, each with different 
requirements but offering the same rights and benefits. 
This article proposes an approach that defines two legally recognized 
relationships: first, for opposite-sex couples desiring a traditional marriage, a 
definition termed “marriage” that comports with the covenant marriage laws 
enacted in Louisiana, Arizona and Arkansas, but with the modifications 
proposed by this article, as discussed above;291 second, for all couples, whether 
same-sex or opposite-sex, a definition termed “domestic partnership” (or “civil 
union” or any other acceptable term other than “marriage”) that generally 
follows the current system that we now call marriage.  Both relationships would 
be entitled to the same rights and benefits.  The distinction between the two 
relationships would be confined to their respective legal definitions.292 
A. Same-Sex Couples Have Rights Too 
The arguments over same-sex marriage are advanced with equal passion 
and commitment on both sides of the debate, and are impossible to reconcile.  
The side one chooses depends upon individual beliefs and value systems.  But a 
compelling argument can be made that denying persons of the same sex the 
right to form legal relationships that are entitled to the same rights and benefits 
as legal relationships opposite-sex couples may form violates the U.S. 
Constitution and/or the constitution of the applicable state.293  Regardless of 
one’s value system, personal beliefs and feelings regarding homosexuality and 
gay marriage, it is extraordinarily difficult to objectively and persuasively argue 
that it is constitutionally permissible to deny substantial rights and benefits to a 
class of individuals based solely on their choice of with whom they form a 
legally recognized relationship. 
 
 290. Wardle, supra note 3, at 490–91 (quoting H. KENT GEIGER, THE FAMILY IN SOVIET RUSSIA 
(1968)). 
 291. See supra notes 78−176 and accompanying text. 
 292. New Jersey has a similar structure currently in place.  Opposite-sex couples may choose 
between marriage and domestic partnership, while same-sex couples are limited to domestic 
partnership.  See Kindregan, supra note 7, at 39. 
 293. See supra notes 246−258 and accompanying text. 
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Constitutional requirements should not negate the adoption of a multi-
faceted approach that defines different legally recognized relationships that are 
available to some couples and not to others.294  The same state-conferred rights 
and benefits must, of course, be available to each type of relationship that is 
legally recognized.  Some of the states that have adopted civil union statutes 
have done exactly that.295  This proposal would afford the same rights and 
benefits to both types of legally recognized relationships. 
B. Public Policy Perspective 
From a public policy standpoint, the conundrum is determining the basis 
for the different relationships that a state will legally recognize and to whom 
they will apply.  Each legally defined relationship must be justified on the basis 
of public policy; otherwise, there is no reason for that relationship to have a 
legal definition different from any other legally recognized relationship. 
The problem with the states’ adoption of civil unions or domestic 
partnerships that have the same rights and benefits as marriage is that they have 
distinguished those relationships from marriage solely on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  The public policy justification reflected an attempt to award the 
rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples while appeasing those who 
believed that same-sex relationships should not be legally recognized in any 
form.  Although laudable for its valiant effort to find middle ground in the 
marriage debates, distinguishing legally recognized relationships based solely 
on sexual orientation fails to recognize that not all opposite-sex relationships are 
functionally equivalent to each other.  One of the chief concerns about legally 
recognizing same-sex marriage, or even recognizing marriage alternatives such 
as civil unions, is the denigration in value of marriage in society and its ultimate 
destruction as an institution.296  As discussed in Part III.A of this article, 
opposite-sex couples have been doing a fine job of devaluing marriage all by 
themselves; they need no assistance from same-sex couples in accomplishing 
that result.297 
Two legally recognized relationships are defined under this proposal: one 
(termed “marriage”) for opposite-sex couples desiring a traditional marriage, 
and another for all other couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex.  One 
principal objective of this approach is to elevate “marriage” to a much more 
honored and valued status than it currently enjoys in our society while 
 
 294. But see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).  See supra notes 194−198 and 
accompanying text.  In addition, the Massachusetts legislature, subsequent to the Goodridge decision, 
drafted a civil union law comparable to Vermont’s and requested an advisory opinion from the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as to whether the law satisfied the court’s constitutional 
concerns stated in Goodridge.  The court replied that the law created even more constitutional 
infirmities because it would relegate same-sex couples to second-class status, and would deprive 
them of a “‘status that is specially recognized in society and has significant social and other 
advantages.’”  Johnson, supra note 5, at 904–905. 
 295. See, e.g., supra note 181 and accompanying text (describing the adoption by the Vermont 
legislature of a civil union statute that provides the same legal benefits to same-sex couples that 
marriage provides to opposite-sex couples). 
 296. See generally supra notes 202−232 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 30–69 and accompanying text. 
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recognizing that not all opposite-sex couples view marriage in that regard.  
Those couples along with same-sex couples would be entitled to enter into a 
legally recognized relationship that has the same rights and benefits as 
marriage, but very different obligations and characteristics based on the 
definitions applicable to each relationship. 
This proposal distinguishes between these two legally recognized 
relationships not solely on the basis of sexual orientation, but primarily on their 
functional distinctions and qualities and the purposes for which the couples 
desire to form them.  For example, couples desiring a traditional marriage are 
intent on forming a life-long relationship that will involve child-bearing and 
parenting.  The covenant marriage laws, with the modifications proposed by 
this article,298 will assist a couple in accomplishing those objectives. 
C. What Makes Marriage So Special? 
What is the public policy justification for treating marriage as a separate, 
legally recognized relationship different from all others?  Marriage has long held 
an esteemed and privileged status in our society; the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,299 described marriage as 
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to 
the degree of being sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, not 
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not 
commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as 
any involved in our prior decisions.300 
Of course, marriage has changed over time; “[f]or most of human history, 
marriage and kin were obvious, urgent, personal necessities.”301  Marriage and 
family were essential to survival.  Family and marital loyalty was an extremely 
important concept, and the decisions of young people to marry and bear 
children “was not just a private, personal taste, but an urgent necessity for the 
family and community.”302  Much has changed in our society in recent decades.  
“Today, government and the market have taken over the family’s once-
undisputed roles as the prime source of key goods; [that is], wealth production 
and social insurance,”303 resulting in a radical change in the importance of the 
family to society and to the individual.304  So, is the Griswold Court’s noble 
description of marriage simply an outdated notion belonging to a bygone era?  
Has the necessity for treating marriage as “intimate to the degree of being 
sacred” gone the way of the buggy whip, so that we can now simply treat all 
 
 298. See supra note 78–176 and accompanying text. 
 299. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 300. Id. at 486.  The Court was speaking of marriage in the traditional sense; i.e., between a man 
and a woman. 
 301. Maggie Gallagher, If Marriage is Natural, Why Is Defending It So Hard?  Taking Up the 
Challenge to Marriage in the Pews and the Public Square, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 409, 412 (2006). 
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 303. Id. at 413. 
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relationships between any two persons the same, at least for purposes of legal 
recognition and regulation? 
Noted authors have devoted much of their scholarship to the repudiation 
of that proposition.  Professor Wardle asserts that “historically marriage has 
always referred to the union of a man and a woman in a unique relationship of 
commitment and intimacy. . .  This is one of the great constants in human 
history—constant across time and across cultures.”305  While legal definitions 
evolve, 
the union of a man and a woman is part of the very nature and reality of the 
marriage relationship itself. . . .  Certainly some other relationships can provide 
the setting for some type of intimacy, other relationships can provide for 
economic support of individuals, children can be propagated in other 
relationships, children can be raised in other environments, and so forth.  But no 
other companionate relationship provides the same great potential for 
benefiting individuals and society as the heterosexual covenant union we call 
marriage . . . . 
. . . 
. . . [I]n some societies and eras, some other companionate or sexual 
relationships have been tolerated, accommodated, permitted, or even 
encouraged, but those other relationships were recognized to be something 
different, not marriages.  The legal status of marriage has been reserved 
exclusively for special covenant heterosexual unions because those unions are 
unique and uniquely beneficial.  The right to enter that unique relationship is 
now generally recognized to be one of the basic human rights because that 
relationship is unique and uniquely important to humanity.306 
Maggie Gallagher has focused particularly on the benefits that marriage 
offers to children, and the benefits to society that result when children 
prosper.307  She asserts that “when mothers and fathers fail to make reasonably 
decent marriages in which to raise their children, most children suffer, and 
many children are damaged.”308  Children of unmarried parents are exposed to 
risks that include “poverty, suicide, mental illness, physical illness, infant 
mortality, lower educational attainment, juvenile delinquency and conduct 
disorder, adult criminality, early unwed parenthood, lower life expectancy, and 
distant relations with both mothers and fathers.”309  These risks cannot be 
entirely controlled simply by the presence in the home of another adult who is 
not the child’s biological parent.  Research on the effects of marriage on children 
demonstrates 
that family structure matters for children, and the family structure that helps 
children the most is a family headed by two biological parents in a low-conflict 
 
 305. Wardle, supra note 228, at 748. 
 306. Id. at 749–50. 
 307. See generally Gallagher, supra note 301, at 417–22 (asserting that marriage exists in some form 
in every society because men and women are naturally and powerfully attracted to sex, sex makes 
babies, society needs babies to survive, and babies need parents who will nurture and care for them). 
 308. Id. at 420. 
 309. Id. at 420–21. 
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marriage.  Children in single-parent families, children born to unmarried 
mothers, and children in stepfamilies or cohabiting relationships face higher 
risks of poor outcomes. . . .  There is thus value for children in promoting strong, 
stable marriages between biological parents.310 
According to thirteen leading family scholars, “[m]arriage is an important 
social good, associated with an impressively broad array of positive outcomes 
for children and adults alike. . . .  [W]hether American society succeeds or fails 
in building a healthy marriage culture is clearly a matter of legitimate public 
concern.”311 
It can certainly be persuasively argued that the representations quoted 
above are purely a matter of opinion and cannot be proven with any degree of 
accuracy.  Indeed, Part IV of this article discusses the counter-arguments made 
by proponents of same-sex marriage particularly in response to Professor 
Wardle’s assertions.  Regardless of which side of this debate one chooses, there 
is a much more compelling reason for separating marriage from all other 
relationships and giving it a separate legal status. 
Presumably it is incontestable that the relationships that provide the most 
benefit to individuals and stability to society are those that are engaged in by 
couples who are deeply committed to each other for life and agree to monogamy 
and to mutual support of each other emotionally, physically and financially.  If 
the relationship involves or produces children, the individual family members 
and society as a whole will benefit most if those children are properly parented 
and nurtured, and receive the necessary care and resources to avoid the risks of 
maladjustment. Professor Wardle uses sexual orientation as the dividing line, 
asserting that only heterosexual unions can provide those benefits, but his use of 
the term “heterosexual covenant union” reminds us that not all heterosexual 
marriages are functionally equivalent.312  Many heterosexual marriages under 
the current system are not “covenant unions” by any stretch, and fall far short of 
the kind of relationship that provides those benefits assumed by Professor 
Wardle.  Furthermore, attaining the current legal status of marriage requires 
nothing more than a marriage license.  There is no assurance that couples 
wishing to attain that status have any idea what it entails, much less understand 
the concept of a “covenant union.”  Simply keeping same-sex couples out of the 
club does nothing to further the objective of strengthening marriage for the 
benefit of society. 
One of the principal goals of this proposal is to elevate marriage to a much 
more honored and valued status than it currently enjoys in our society.  This 
goal will be achieved by separating marriage from all other relationships and 
defining it by use of the covenant marriage laws, with the modifications 
proposed by this article.  The premarital counseling provisions, in particular, 
will better prepare couples for the realities of marriage and the issues they will 
inevitably be forced to deal with.  That preparation will provide them with a 
greater chance that the marriage will be successful, and allow them to build a 
stronger foundation for their marriage prior to the ceremony.  Ultimately, the 
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number of marriages that end up in divorce will be reduced.  Furthermore, 
appropriate premarital counseling will force couples who are ill-suited for each 
other to come face to face with their differences, and possibly decide to avoid 
altogether entering into a problematic marriage that might eventually end in 
divorce. 
The proposal defines marriage to include only opposite-sex couples.  It will 
perhaps be criticized for that reason, but there exists no rational basis for any 
such criticism.  As a practical matter, inclusion of same-sex couples in the 
definition of marriage would surely result in more of the same vigorous debate 
we have suffered for the past several decades, with no resolution possible.  More 
importantly, if proponents of same-sex marriage have been truthful in 
advancing their side of the debate, their principal and most compelling 
argument is that denying persons of the same sex the right to marry violates the 
U.S. Constitution and/or the constitution of the applicable state.  This proposal 
arguably solves the constitutional issue by including same-sex couples in the 
definition of domestic partnership, which would be entitled to the same rights 
and benefits as marriage.313 
Some proponents of same-sex marriage, however, have gone further with 
this issue and argued that the right to marry is a basic human right.  By denying 
same-sex couples the right to marry, “the state devalues the lives of its gay and 
lesbian citizens, denying their very citizenship in a vital respect that others take 
for granted.”314  Professor Sparling makes an even more emotional appeal.  “To 
deny gay people the right to marry is to deny a part of our humanity, to deprive 
us of the opportunity to achieve one of the pinnacles of human fulfillment, and 
to forswear our ability to participate most fully in family life.”315  These 
statements fuel suspicions long held by opponents of same-sex marriage; that 
gays and lesbians have become intransigent with regard to insisting that they be 
included in the definition of marriage because what they really want is the 
acceptance and approval by society of their sexual orientation.316  This rationale 
has sometimes been acknowledged by gay and lesbian authors.  Paula Ettelbrick 
 
 313. But see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).  See supra notes 195−198 and 
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 316. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 227, at 617 (asserting that a segment of those supporting gay 
marriage reject domestic partnership and civil union laws, even though they provide the same 
benefits as marriage, because what those supporters really want is the honor, respect and social 
approval associated with traditional marriage). 
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writes that “[m]arriage provides the ultimate form of acceptance for personal, 
intimate relationships in our society . . . .  Given the imprimatur of social and 
personal approval that marriage provides, it is not surprising that some lesbians 
and gay men among us would look to legal marriage for self-affirmation.”317  
But, she insightfully concludes that “[w]e must not fool ourselves into believing 
that marriage will make it acceptable to be gay or lesbian.  We will be liberated 
only when we are respected and accepted for our differences and the diversity 
we provide to this society.”318 
Another suspicion long held by opponents of same-sex marriage is that 
gays and lesbians desire the right to marry for the purpose of destroying the 
institution from within.  In its early years, the Gay Rights Movement supported 
this view: “Marriage, the argument ran, was an oppressive, sexist, and 
inherently heterosexual institution.  The movement’s goal was to weaken the 
institution as a whole, to subvert and undermine it, and to create alternative 
structures within which to explore homosexual desire, love, and family.”319 
Professors Culhane and Sparling will perhaps still feel devalued and 
excluded by this proposal of two legally recognized relationships, or perhaps 
they will be satisfied by the inclusion of same-sex couples in the definition of 
domestic partnership.  In any event, they will be unable to make a valid 
argument that the proposal somehow violates their constitutional rights. 
There is another, more intangible reason this proposal will strengthen 
marriage and elevate it to a more honored and valued status.  A significant 
proportion of heterosexual couples will, for various reasons, be attracted to 
marriage rather than domestic partnership.  They may be attracted to the more 
rigid requirements for entering that relationship and the improved chances of 
success that those requirements provide, or they may be attracted to the 
elevated status society may award to marriage over domestic partnership.  
Couples may decide on marriage because of pressure from family or from their 
future partners, or encouragement from their religious leaders.  They may 
choose marriage simply because it is the relationship couples in our society have 
traditionally chosen since the beginning of our culture.  For whatever reason, 
there will be a significant number of heterosexual couples who choose the 
marriage option. 
A substantial number of people in our society consider themselves actively 
religious,320 and most of those couples will choose marriage because of these 
religious beliefs.  The vast majority of Americans who are members of an 
organized religion belong to Judeo-Christian denominations321 and believe that 
marriage is created by God.  Catholicism views marriage as a sacrament;322 one 
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author cites Pope Pius XI for the proposition that “[m]arriage is the promise to 
love just one other human being in the way that God loves everyone.”323  
Christians of all denominations adhere to the teachings of Saint Paul.  In his 
letter to the Ephesians, Paul gives the following instructions to wives and 
husbands: 
Wives, submit to your husbands as to the Lord.  For the husband is the head of 
the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of which he is the Savior.  
Now as the church submits to Christ, so also wives should submit to their 
husbands in everything. 
Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up 
for her to make her holy . . . .  In this way, husbands ought to love their wives as 
their own bodies.  He who loves his wife loves himself. . . .  “For this reason a 
man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will 
become one flesh.”324 
Contrary to frequent interpretation, what Paul is describing in these verses 
is not a relationship where the husband and wife each pursue their own 
personal fulfillment and satisfaction of their own personal needs, or a one-sided 
relationship where the wife submits to the authority of the husband and the 
husband gives nothing of value to the wife; instead, Paul is describing a 
mutually loving, supportive, Godly, sacrificial, spiritual, service-centered 
relationship, where both spouses focus all of their energies and gifts to satisfying 
the needs of each other. 
When a significant number of deeply religious couples choose the marriage 
option under this proposal and experience much stronger marriages because of 
the counseling and other required provisions, society will have a successful 
model to which  other couples can aspire.  If marriage becomes a highly 
successful, rewarding, and mutually enjoyable institution in our society, more 
couples will be interested in choosing that option, and society will reap the 
benefits resulting from a greater number of stable relationships and stronger 
families.  To borrow Professor Zelinsky’s reasoning, if more than one option 
exists for couples to form a legally recognized relationship, “a productive 
competition” will ensue.  Traditional religions will have an equal opportunity to 
convince couples that their form of relationship is the best.325 
 VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is no question that both the concept and practice of marriage in 
America have dramatically evolved over the last half-century or so.  The divorce 
rate has exponentially increased to the extent that approximately half of all 
marriages end in divorce;326 both men and women are increasingly delaying 
marriage or rejecting it altogether; and more than one-third of births are to 
unmarried mothers.  These factors have all contributed to the notion that the 
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institution of marriage in the United States is “withering away,” resulting in 
peril to families and to society. 
In addition, a prodigious debate has erupted over the meaning of 
“marriage” and its role in society.  One side desires an expansion of the 
definition of marriage, and the other desires the restrictive definition already 
currently in place in most jurisdictions.  The camp in favor of expansion is most 
particularly interested in including same-sex couples in the definition of 
marriage, or at least creating a parallel relationship status for same-sex couples 
that would exist alongside marriage and would confer all the same rights and 
benefits. The restrictive camp is adamantly opposed to including same-sex 
couples in the definition of marriage, and most members are opposed to 
creating any other type of legal status for same-sex couples that is similar in any 
way to marriage.  Each side of this debate is equally convinced of the merits of 
its arguments, making them vigorously with legal, ethical, moral and religious 
overtones. 
Various responses and proposals have been made to address the concerns 
that many have expressed regarding their perception that the institution of 
marriage is in decline, and to offer compromise in hopes of resolving the 
convoluted, often bitter, marriage debate.  Three states have enacted covenant 
marriage laws, which establish a second tier of marriage that couples can choose 
if they desire.  Covenant marriages have very stringent entrance and exit 
requirements, and require a couple to acknowledge that they agree to be 
married for life.  Some commentators have proposed replacing the legal status of 
marriage with a new status bearing different nomenclature, and others have 
suggested abolishing marriage, or at least the regulation of marriage by 
government. 
No consensus has been reached regarding a universal definition of a legally 
recognized relationship that would replace the current status of marriage, yet no 
one seems satisfied with the status quo.  It is likely not possible to define 
marriage in any single way that would not violate the personal sense of morals, 
ethics and beliefs of a significant portion of the population.  Resolution of this 
issue will require a multi-faceted approach that provides for more than one 
legally recognized relationship that couples may enter, each with different 
requirements but offering the same rights and benefits. 
This article proposes an approach that defines two legally recognized 
relationships: first, for opposite-sex couples desiring a traditional marriage, a 
definition termed “marriage” that comports with the covenant marriage laws 
enacted in Louisiana, Arizona and Arkansas, but with the modifications 
proposed by this article, as discussed above; and second, for all couples, 
whether same-sex or opposite-sex, a definition termed “domestic partnership” 
(or “civil union” or any other acceptable term other than “marriage”) that 
generally follows the current system that we now call marriage.  Both 
relationships would be entitled to the same rights and benefits.  The distinction 
between the two relationships would be confined to their respective legal 
definitions. 
As discussed above, it is extraordinarily difficult to objectively and 
persuasively argue that it is constitutionally permissible to deny substantial 
rights and benefits to a class of individuals, based solely on their choice of with 
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whom they form a legally recognized relationship.  This proposal arguably 
solves that constitutional issue by including same-sex couples in the definition 
of domestic partnership, which would be entitled to the same rights and benefits 
as marriage. 
In addition, this proposal elevates marriage to a much more honored and 
valued status than it currently enjoys in our society by separating marriage from 
all other relationships, and defining it by use of the covenant marriage laws, 
with the modifications proposed by this article.  If marriage becomes a highly 
successful, rewarding and mutually enjoyable institution in our society, more 
couples will be interested in choosing that option, and society as a whole will 
reap the benefits resulting from a greater number of stable relationships and 
stronger families. 
 
